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Conflict, shocks and social behavior: Three essays on social responses to social
disruptions
Daniel R. Thomas
Events such as conflicts, natural disasters, online deplatformings, and economic collapses
can force people away from their long-standing social networks and require them to rebuild
their social lives in new locations or settings. How do social networks shape the effects of
these disruptions on communities? How does social behavior respond to violence? In this
dissertation, I investigate the dynamic relationship between violence and social networks.
In two essays, I analyze the effect of violence on social behavior in two contexts, using
data from conflict-affected communities in Myanmar and Ukraine. In the third essay, I
formally study the relationship between civilians’ social network characteristics and the
optimal violence strategies for states.
The first essay investigates the effects of exposure to violence on social network compo-
sition and formation among internally displaced people (IDPs) in Kachin State, Myanmar.
Using original survey data from 5 camps, I find that those exposed to violence on the ex-
tensive margin have fewer initial, new, and close ties and those exposed on the intensive
margin have fewer new ties within the camps. However, those exposed to violence do not
form ties with other exposed IDPs at a higher rate than with non-exposed IDPs.
The second essay asks, how does exposure to violence affect the ability of forcibly
internally displaced people (IDPs) to integrate into new communities? I introduce and
test a demand-side theory of integration using the case of internally displaced people in
Ukraine. Using original survey data, I show that those directly exposed to violence are less
successful in integrating into their new communities. Moreover, I show that the results are
consistent with a psychological mechanism: those directly exposed to violence are more
likely to exhibit symptoms associated with post-traumatic stress disorder.
The third essay asks, how does the structure of civilians’ social networks shape the
optimal form of violence to be used against them? Theories explaining why states choose to
use targeted or indiscriminate violence against civilians hinge on the state’s capacity to gain
information about whom to target and its ability to do enough damage to prevent defection
to the rebel’s side. In contrast to these theories, I show that the choice of strategy depends
on the characteristics of the community experiencing the violence, not the state employing
it. This essay argues that even when states can target certain civilians, they may choose to
employ indiscriminate violence due to characteristics of civilians’ social network structure.
The state’s optimal strategy of violence is driven by two factors: the degree distribution
of civilians’ social networks and the correlation between citizens’ motivation to leave a
network and citizens’ value to other nodes in the network. When the degree distribution
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Social ties and networks have immense effects on the behavior of individuals and organiza-
tions. For individuals, the relationships they form and maintain allow access to information,
employment, and social services, and create the conditions necessary for reciprocity and
sharing to be maintained [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]. As individuals become more connected to their
communities, they’re better able to increase their economic status, engage in civic life, and
participate in politics [6, 7, 8]. At the organization level, the structure and composition of
social networks influence the ability of leadership to coordinate existing members, recruit
new ones, and reinforce group identities [9]. Organizations with dense social networks are
more able to leverage diversity in expertise, by sharing knowledge and information more
effectively [10], and can prevent conflict among co-members [11].
However, these social networks are dynamic. Life changes and chance encounters lead
to the creation of new social ties and the degradation of old ones such that social networks
are ever-evolving. In rare cases, large-scale disruptions can alter networks completely, forc-
ing those affected to change both with whom and how they interact socially. Events such as
conflicts, natural disasters, online deplatformings, and economic collapses can force people
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away from their long-standing social networks and require them to rebuild their social lives
in new locations or settings. On the other hand, the structure of social networks can shape
the effects of such disruptions. In cases where the shocks to the networks are strategic,
such as in conflicts, characteristics of social networks can determine the optimal form of
disruption.
In this dissertation, I investigate the dynamic relationship between violence and social
networks. In two essays, I analyze the effect of violence on social behavior in two contexts,
using data from conflict-affected communities in Myanmar and Ukraine. These essays seek
to determine how conflict shapes the social behavior of the most vulnerable: internally
displaced people. In the third essay, I analyze the relationship between social network
structure and optimal strategies of violence using a formal social network model. The
essay asks, how does the structure of civilians’ social networks shape the optimal form of
violence to be used against them? I study a formal model and employ simulations to show
that the social network characteristics of civilian communities can lead to indiscriminate
violence being strategic for the state, despite its drawbacks. Here, I briefly describe these
three essays.
1.2 Two essays on conflict and social behavior
The first two essays of my dissertation seek to understand how violence shapes the social
lives of non-combatants during conflict. While the large-scale effects of conflict have been
studied extensively [e.g. 12, 13, 14], less attention has been paid to how active conflicts
shape the everyday lives of affected civilians. Wars do not only affect institutions, leaders,
and elites, and they have effects long before peace is attained; The approximately 45.7
2
Chapter 1. Introduction
million internally displaced people worldwide have borne the brunt of conflict directly and
immediately. Understanding their ability to cope with and recover from conflict is a key
step in understanding the broader effects of war and prospects for rebuilding society. To
study this, I employ data from original surveys in Myanmar and Ukraine.
1.2.1 Essay 1: The effects of exposure to violence on social network
composition and formation: Evidence from IDP camps in Myan-
mar
The first dissertation essay asks how exposure to violence affects the composition of civil-
ian social networks during wartime. Past research has demonstrated that civilian social net-
works play important roles in civil wars, affecting the ability of insurgencies to wage wars
and the ability of non-combatants to persevere through the destruction of conflict. How-
ever, despite our knowledge of the importance of these networks, little is known about how
conflict transforms them. Determining how wartime violence shapes social networks is
necessary to grasp the role of these networks in conflict and to understand how civil war
affects the long-term social and political landscapes of conflict-affected societies [15, 16].
To determine how conflict shapes civilians’ social networks, I employ unique and detailed
data on the wartime experiences of IDPs and their within-IDP-camp social networks, from
a sample of 5 IDP camps in Kachin State, Myanmar. I find that, on the extensive margin,
those exposed to violence have significantly smaller networks of initial ties, new ties, and
close ties within the camps, suggesting that violence erodes total network size both by de-
creasing the number of initial ties that an IDP has in a camp, and inhibiting their ability to
form new ties. On the intensive margin, experiencing greater levels of violence than other
exposed individuals decreases the number of new ties an IDP has in a camp but has no
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effect on their initial ties or close ties. The results suggest that the negative effects of expo-
sure to violence on the ability to form new ties outweigh the increased value that ties may
have for those exposed to violence. I then take advantage of the rich social network data
to understand how these differences in tie formation shape the overall network. Employing
dyadic regression I show that dyads in which both members have the same exposure status
are much more likely to form ties than dyads with one individual having been exposed, but
that this effect is driven by dyads with no exposed individuals. Dyads with two exposed
individuals are not more likely to form ties than dyads with one exposed individual, sug-
gesting that those exposed to violence are not more likely to form ties with other exposed
individuals.
1.2.2 Essay 2: Conflict and social integration among the displaced:
Theory and evidence from Ukraine
My second essay asks: what factors affect the ability of the displaced people to integrate
into new communities? Along with return or resettlement, one durable solution to pro-
tracted displacement is local integration, where the displaced become stable, long-term
members of their new communities [17, 18]. However, holding external factors constant,
there exists variation in the ability of IDPs to achieve integration. What factors explain this
variation?
In this essay, I analyze the effects of exposure to violence on the ability of internally
displaced people in Ukraine to integrate into their new communities. While much is known
about the effects of external factors, such as government policies and host-community atti-
tudes, on integration [e.g. 19, 20, 21, 22, 23], less is understood about how the displaceds’
lived experiences shape their desire and ability to integrate. However, such research ignores
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the agency of refugees and IDPs in integration.
To study this, I introduce and test a demand-side theory of integration using the case of
internally displaced people in Ukraine. I argue that the decision to pursue integration for
an IDP or refugee depends on their projected length of stay in a community and the costs
of attempting to integrate. Exposure to violence affects both of these factors, making IDPs
more likely to remain, but also increasing the costs of integration.
Using original survey data, I show that those directly exposed to violence are less likely
to successfully integrate into their new communities. Consistent with the theoretical frame-
work, those exposed to violence display evidence of downstream effects of trauma, which
in turn decreases their ability to integrate. The research shows that the outcome of mi-
grant integration efforts can be shaped by characteristics of IDPs themselves instead of
being driven solely by the attitudes of host communities and policies of receiving-country
governments.
1.3 One essay on violence strategies by states in social net-
works
1.3.1 Essay 3: Targeted and indiscriminate state violence in networks
My third essay asks: why do states employ indiscriminate violence against civilians, even
when it can cause mobilization in favor of insurgents? Past theoretical work on this topic
predicts that indiscriminate violence should be used rarely or only over short time frames,
but the repeated use of such violence against civilians has been seen in a multitude of con-
flicts [24, 25]. This suggests that states may have incentives to use indiscriminate violence
against civilians, even when other strategies are available to them. I offer a theory sug-
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gesting that indiscriminate violence can be the state’s preferred strategy even when it can
engage in targeted violence, conditional on visible characteristics of the structure of civil-
ians’ social networks. I study a formal social network model of violence and displacement
in order to understand the choice of the state to use targeted or indiscriminate violence
against a community of civilians in order to remove them from a territory. With this setup,
I analyze the effects of changes in network structure in response to violence directly and
examine how they determine the strategic behavior of the state.
I show that the characteristics of civilian social networks shape the optimal strategy for
the state. The state’s choice is determined by both network structure and the distribution
of individual attributes of civilians in the network. The results of the model demonstrate
that indiscriminate violence can be preferred to targeted violence based on characteristics
at two levels: at the network level, as the distribution of degree among nodes becomes more
uniform, indiscriminate violence becomes more valuable. At the individual level, as value
for others in the network and motivation to leave the network are more positively correlated
throughout the community, the unraveling effect of indiscriminate violence is greater. Sub-
stantively, the analysis indicates that strategies of violence can have heterogeneous effects
depending on the composition of the community experiencing violence. This differs from
past theories which view the state’s choice of violence as a function of the state’s levels of
information and technology.
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Chapter 2
The effects of exposure to violence on social network
composition and formation: Evidence from IDP camps in
Myanmar
2.1 Introduction
While combatants receive the bulk of the attention during armed conflict, civilian social
networks play important roles in civil wars. First, civilian social networks affect the suc-
cess of insurgencies in several ways: they provide access to information and supplies [26,
27], influence mobilization decisions [28], determine the cohesiveness of rebel movements
[29], affect the ability of civilians to protect themselves from violence [30], and influence
the effectiveness of counterinsurgency [31]. Second, for those suffering from protracted
conflict, social networks are crucial for coping and recovery: they substitute for formal in-
stitutions by providing insurance and credit [1], allow for contract enforcement [2, 3], and
spread important information [4].
These effects persist, shaping civilians’ ability to recover from conflict in the long-
term [32]. Post-conflict, these networks have lasting effects on political and economic life,
facilitating collective action [33], the diffusion of information [5, 34], cooperation [35],
and shaping political behavior as varied as turning out to vote [7], civic engagement [8],
and participating in contentious action [36, 37]. However, while past studies have treated
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civilians’ social networks as given, these networks are unlikely to escape conflict unscathed
[16]. Determining how wartime violence transforms social networks is necessary to grasp
these networks’ role in conflict and understand how war affects the long-term social and
political landscapes of conflict-affected societies [15, 16].
This essay studies the effects of exposure to state-perpetrated wartime violence on
social network composition and formation among internally displaced people (IDPs) in
Kachin State, Myanmar, an area of protracted internal conflict. I argue that exposure to
violence affects both the size of IDPs’ initial social networks in the camps, their ability to
form new ties, and the characteristics of people with whom they form ties. First, violence
removes ties in a network directly through death and separation, leading those exposed to
violence to have fewer initial social ties after displacement. Second, exposure to violence
shapes IDPs’ ability to form new ties: on the one hand, trauma experienced due to violence
may lessen the ability of IDPs to form new ties [38, 39, 40]. On the other hand, those
exposed to violence may have incentives to form new ties in order to compensate for those
lost during displacement, and ties may be uniquely valuable to those exposed to violence
because they function as a form of social protection. Thus, the effect of violence on new
tie formation is an empirical question.
Exposure to violence may also affect the types of contacts with whom IDPs choose
to form ties. IDPs may exhibit homophily in their tie formation in regards to exposure to
violence, meaning those exposed to violence would be more likely to form ties with other
exposed IDPs [41]. For example, IDPs with similar displacement experiences may relate
to each other to a greater extent and thus feel more comfortable forming ties. Conversely,
because forming ties, in general, can be more difficult for IDPs exposed to violence, dyads
composed of two IDPs who have been exposed to violence may not form a tie because
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initiating the connection is difficult for both.
I evaluate these mechanisms by using unique and detailed data on IDPs’ wartime ex-
periences and their within-IDP-camp social networks. I construct networks of social ties
between IDPs at the IDP camp level and examine how exposure to violence at the indi-
vidual level affects how these networks form. The data is collected exclusively from those
displaced by the conflict, so the empirical strategy isolates the direct effect of violence
among those who have had a common experience of displacement. Employing this data, I
first examine how exposure to violence along both the extensive (whether one was present
while violence occurred) and intensive margin (whether one directly experienced violence)
affects the number of initial, new, and close ties that IDPs have within the camps. Second,
I evaluate whether exposure to violence affects the types of ties that are formed in camps,
examining whether ties exhibit homophily in regards to exposure to violence.
I find that, on the extensive margin, those exposed to violence have significantly smaller
networks of initial ties, new ties, and close ties within the camps, suggesting that violence
erodes total network size both by decreasing the number of initial ties that an IDP has
in a camp and inhibiting their ability to form new ties. Moreover, I show that there is
no evidence for several alternative explanations: the finding does not appear to be driven
by the selection of villages into violence, differences in pre-existing social network size
between those who left the village before or after violence occurred, differences in time
spent in the camp, or solely through having smaller networks of relatives in the camps. On
the intensive margin, experiencing greater levels of violence than other exposed individuals
decreases the number of new ties an IDP has in a camp but has no effect on their initial ties
or close ties. The results suggest that the negative effects of exposure to violence on the
ability to form new ties outweigh the increased value that ties may have for those exposed
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to violence.
After establishing that violence reduces the size of victims’ social networks, I take ad-
vantage of the rich social network data to understand how these differences in tie formation
shape the overall network. Employing dyadic regression, which also allows me to adjust
measures of uncertainty to account for network dependence, I show that dyads in which
both members have the same exposure status are much more likely to form ties than dyads
with one individual having been exposed, but that this effect is driven by dyads with no
exposed individuals. Dyads with two exposed individuals are not more likely to form ties
than dyads with one exposed individual, suggesting that those exposed to violence are not
more likely to form ties with other exposed individuals.
This research builds on a growing literature on the effects of violence against civilians
during wartime [e.g. 42, 43, 44, 45, 46]. While past research has shown that exposure to
violence increases pro-social behavior, less is understood about how violence shapes the
social environments that civilians live in [47, 48]. I make two contributions to the literature
on violence and pro-sociality: first, I show that civilians have fewer social ties after being
exposed to violence. If the total effect of a pro-social action is conditional on the number of
social ties that a civilian has, then altruistic behavior from victims of violence may not have
as large of welfare effects as theorized. Second, while past research has found that violence
and social context interact to increase pro-social behavior [49], I show that violence shapes
victims’ social context, indicating that social context may be a mediator rather than a stand-
alone cause of the behavior of victims of violence.
The findings also contribute to the understanding of the incentives of states to engage in
violence against civilians [50, 51].1 The fact that violence shrinks victims’ social networks
1See Balcells and Stanton [52] for a recent review.
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suggests that violence against civilians can play a role in decreasing the ability of militant
organizations to wage war. This argument runs contrary to past theories, which argue that
violence against civilians can promote mobilization and hurt the state’s efforts [53, 28].
If victims are less tied to the community, they may also be less likely to be mobilized or
radicalized. Thus, violence against civilians in wars may be understood as a strategy to
dismantle sources of support for insurgents.
The findings can help inform policy responses to large-scale displacement. I show
that those exposed to violence have fewer ties within IDP camps than those who are not
exposed, even six years after arriving in the camps. This result indicates that those who
already suffer more during the displacement process also have less immediate sources of
insurance and protection upon their arrival in camps. These IDPs may require special
attention and programming from humanitarian organizations over time.
Finally, the design of the study offers a new approach to studying the integration out-
comes of the displaced. While integration in other settings has been measured through em-
ployment outcomes [54], language skills and housing [55], and other behavioral measures
[56], I measure integration by constructing the social networks of the IDPs themselves. The
social network approach utilized here improves upon past studies of integration in two key
ways: first, it moves beyond measuring the number of ties respondents list; it also accounts
for the number of other IDPs who name the respondent as a social tie [57]. Second, not
only can this approach answer ’how many ties does an IDP have?” but it can also give
insight into the second-order question of: “who do IDPs form ties with?”.
The article is structured as follows: in the next section, I introduce a framework out-
lining the possible effects of exposure to violence on social network formation among the
internally displaced. Following this, I give an overview of the case and introduce the data.
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Then, I outline the empirical strategy. I then present the results and assess possible al-
ternative explanations. Following this, I discuss the results and the generalizability of the
findings and conclude.
2.2 How exposure to violence affects social network for-
mation
Exposure to violence has many possible effects on the social ties of civilians. In this section,
I separately explain how exposure to violence affects the number of initial ties (ties that
existed before displacement that exist in the camps) that IDPs have and how exposure to
violence affects IDPs’ ability and incentives to form new ties.
2.2.1 Exposure to violence and initial ties
Wartime violence should degrade the social networks of civilians who are present when the
attacks occur through death and separation. Individuals in villages that experience violence
may lose social ties directly, through killing, arrest, disappearance, and abduction. Victims
may also be separated from their ties by losing touch with their contacts while escaping
from the violence. Thus, on the extensive margin, those exposed to violence should have
fewer initial ties within villages than those not exposed.
Violence should also differentially affect those who were present during the violence
and those who were directly affected by it. Civilians directly affected by violence are
more likely to lose their strong ties. Social network ties tend to be correlated with physical
distance; people form ties with others closer to them [58, 59]. Thus, if the household of
a member of a village is directly affected by violence, then they may lose their family
12
Chapter 2. The effects of exposure to violence on social network
composition and formation: Evidence from IDP camps in Myanmar
members to death or displacement or lose ties to neighbors in the case of shelling or other
indiscriminate forms of violence. Moreover, this effect on strong ties can lead to a further
loss of ties if the lost ties served as bridges to other village members.
In the context of forced displacement, all civilians will have their social networks dis-
rupted. It is unlikely that entire towns, villages, or even neighborhoods would remain com-
pletely intact while being forced to move to a new location. However, exposure to violence
will further dismantle these networks. Thus, households that report being directly exposed
to violence will be less likely to have ties in networks that existed prior to displacement.
2.2.2 Exposure to violence and the formation of new ties
Exposure to violence should also affect the number of new ties (ties formed after arriving
in the camps) that IDPs have. However, these effects may be countervailing: exposure to
violence can cause trauma, making forming ties difficult. Conversely, exposure to violence
may also increase the value of social protection for IDPs, increasing their incentives to form
ties. Thus, the effect of exposure to violence on the formation of new ties is ultimately an
empirical question.
2.2.2.1 Trauma
Violence experienced during the displacement process can affect an IDP’s ability to so-
cialize and successfully form new ties. Exposure to violence is associated with increased
psychological distress and trauma, even among IDPs who have had a shared experience of
displacement [38]. The psychological symptoms can take many forms: combat exposure
has been found as a primary factor in post-traumatic stress disorder and depression [60,
61]. Moya [62] shows that more severe and recent experiences of violence increase anxiety
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and phobic anxiety.
These psychological symptoms can create difficulties in integration. According to
Schick, Zumwald, Knöpfli, Nickerson, Bryant, Schnyder, Müller, and Morina [39], “the
process of social integration implies high functional requirements in terms of cognitive and
interpersonal capabilities, which refugees with psychological impairments are often not
able to meet.” In their study, depression, PTSD, and anxiety were correlated with difficul-
ties in integration among refugees in Switzerland. A possible mechanism for this finding
is that mental health issues due to trauma increase the difficulties and costs of engaging in
activities necessary for integration. As Phillimore [40, p. 588] noted in a study of refugees
in England, “Those who had a diagnosed mental health problem felt particularly isolated,
and struggled to engage in activities that might lead them to integrate, unable as they were
to develop relationships with local people, seek employment, learn the language or even
communicate with their peers.” The relationship between trauma and inability to integrate
has been found in other contexts: in Canada, Somali refugees who experienced trauma had
lower cultural adaptation [63], and among refugees in the Netherlands, good mental health
status was associated with increased employment and less dependence on social benefits
[64]. This evidence suggests that victims of violence should have less capability to form
new ties. This effect should be observed in comparisons of those who were present during
violence and those who were not, and in comparisons of those who were directly affected
by violence and those who were present but not directly affected.
2.2.2.2 Incentives to form new ties
However, violence could also increase the incentives for victims of violence to form new
ties in order to replace the ties they lost during the displacement process and establish so-
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cial support. For the displaced, social networks can function as a form of social protection
by facilitating access to employment and providing informal insurance against risk and
psycho-social support [65]. In conflict-affected and developing contexts where leadership
and institutions are largely informal, social networks have significant influence, serving as
a source of financial security and information [4], providing access to employment oppor-
tunities and aid programs [66, 67], enabling recovery by serving as a form of insurance
[68, 69, 70], and allowing for favor exchange to occur without fear of defection [71]. So-
cial support can also aid in recovery from trauma, necessary for victims of violence [72,
73].
In the study location, social networks function as critical safety nets. In the non-
government controlled area (NGCA) where this study took place, the Myanmar govern-
ment has prohibited international organizations from operating and often blocked humani-
tarian aid provision [74]. Within camps, there are clear attempts to form community-based
protection [75]. Where aid is limited, blocked, delayed, or non-existent, informal social
relations fill the gap. In this context, a lack of social ties could have significant effects on
well-being. Within the camps surveyed in this study, IDPs see social ties and community
building as critical factors in their ability to survive and recover from conflict. Figure 2.1
shows that the majority of the surveyed IDPs believe they can borrow from community
members if necessary, that sharing with others can make their situation more secure in the
future, that strengthening the IDP community can increase their ability to cope with bad
events, and state that they would prefer to partially ensure all households in camps from
disasters rather than fully insure their own.
Moreover, the number of ties that IDPs have in the camps is correlated with their percep-
tions of safety and security. Figure 2.2 shows the results of regressing safety and security
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Figure 2.1: Descriptive evidence of the value of social ties in the IDP camps. The majority
of IDPs state that they can borrow from community members if necessary, that sharing
increases their security, that strengthening the IDP community increases their ability to
cope with adverse events, and that they prefer insurance that protects all IDPs somewhat
instead of guaranteeing protection for themselves.
16
Chapter 2. The effects of exposure to violence on social network
composition and formation: Evidence from IDP camps in Myanmar
Borrow from community if needed
Fear walking at night
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Degree in close ties network
Figure 2.2: The effects of degree in the close ties network on measures of well-being.
Degree in the network is correlated with less fear walking at night and greater ability to
borrow from community members.
indicators on degree in the close ties networks, with camp fixed effects. Degree is corre-
lated with a decreased fear of walking at night and increased belief that one could borrow
from a community member if possible. While not causal or definitive, these correlations
suggest that social ties in the camps play a role in determining the well-being of IDPs.
Together, this evidence indicates that IDPs have incentives to maintain and form ties
within camps. Because those exposed to violence have less initial ties and may lose more
assets during the displacement process, they should have greater incentives to form new
ties than those who were not exposed. This effect may be observed both on the extensive
and intensive margins: those who were present during violence should find more value in
ties than those who were not, and those who experienced violence directly should find more
value in ties than those who were only present during attacks.
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2.2.3 Exposure to violence can affect who forms ties with whom
Along with affecting the number of ties that IDPs have in camps, exposure to violence may
also affect the types of people with whom IDPs form ties. I identify two pathways through
which exposure to violence may affect whom IDPs form ties with: homophily and trauma.
Those exposed to violence may relate to each other more, forming ties together at a
higher rate. In social networks, people tend to have contact with others who resemble
them, such that social networks exhibit homophily, where similar people cluster together
in communities [41]. While structural factors such as geography, family ties, and organi-
zations are critical drivers of homophily [58, 41, 76, 77], there is also an argument that
homophily arises due to choice: similarity in identity may drive choices to form ties be-
cause it is easier to establish trust with similar people [78]. If exposure to violence becomes
a salient aspect of IDPs’ identities, they may be more likely to choose to form ties with one
another.
These relationships may arise as a response to the need to cope with exposure to vio-
lence. Victims of traumatic events often seek to talk about their experiences as a form of
coping [79]. Victims of violence may seek to talk about their experiences and could find
other victims to be more receptive audiences, increasing their propensity to form social ties.
While people undergoing stress often turn toward long-term relationships for support, they
may also form new ties “when they identify with another person going through a similar
stressor” [80, p. 585]. This is because “being part of a collective or larger unit stitched
together by the same experience could make this experience less threatening and less con-
fusing” [81, p. 30]. Victims of violence may understand each others’ experiences better
and be more sympathetic as a result. Thus, they may be more likely to form ties.
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On the other hand, as argued above, exposure to traumatic events may make forming
ties more difficult. For IDPs exposed to violence, the act of socializing and attempting to
create new relationships may be more costly. Even if exposed IDPs prefer to form ties
with other exposed IDPs, if they are less able to form ties in general then dyads with two
exposed members may be less likely to form ties than other types of dyads. Therefore, it
is unclear whether ties between IDPs will exhibit homophily with regards to exposure to
violence.
2.3 Context: The Kachin Conflict
2.3.1 Overview
I assess the effects of exposure to violence on social networks with evidence from a study
fielded in Kachin State, Myanmar, in 2019. Kachin State is one of seven states in Myanmar
and is located in the North, bordering China. The state is characterized by its natural
beauty: it contains the highest mountain in Myanmar and one of Southeast Asia’s largest
inland lakes. Its capital, Myitkyina, lies on the bank of the Ayeyarwaddy River. Kachin
State’s economy is primarily driven by natural resources: rice, teak, sugar cane, and opium
are all cultivated, while gold and jade are mined. China has invested extensively in the
cultivation of the natural resources of the state.
The Kachin conflict began in 1961, with a ceasefire lasting from 1994 to 2011. Peace
collapsed in 2011 following an offensive by the Tatmadaw (the Myanmar army) against
the Kachin Independence Army (KIA). The proximate cause for the conflict was a dispute
over an area in which a dam was built earlier in the year. However, tensions had been rising
previously, after Myanmar forces took custody of two KIA officials in 2010 and barred
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Kachin participation in the 2010 national elections [82]. The conflict has continued since,
characterized by large-scale airstrikes and artillery attacks by the Tatmadaw, leading to the
displacement of more than 100,000 civilians [83]. The Kachin have also lost control of
areas as the Tatmadaw has extended its reach into the state [84]. The majority of clashes
between state forces and the KIA have been related to natural resources and trade routes
[85].
The conflict has forced the displacement of large numbers of Kachin civilians. Along
with this displacement, extensive state repression and abuse towards the Kachin people
have been documented. Interviews conducted by Human Rights Watch in early 2011 de-
scribed a conflict in which “Burmese army soldiers have attacked Kachin villages, razed
homes, pillaged properties and forced the displacement of tens of thousands of people.”
Civilians have experienced many forms of violence, including being fired on by small arms
and mortars, experiencing threats, torture, and sexual violence [82]. Displaced civilians
have been forced to leave to camps for the internally displaced, some hiding in the jungle
for weeks before making their way to the camps.
Interviews by Human Rights Watch demonstrated abuses by the Myanmar army against
civilians [82]. Those interviewed reported the robbing of houses and shops by soldiers and
the destruction of property and buildings. Other Kachin civilians describe being fired on
while fleeing their village, and that “their villages, with no known KIA presence, were
shelled by mortars from government positions” [82, p.37]. Others reported indiscriminate
firing, such as one Kachin woman, who said, “In the morning when we were cooking rice,
we heard gunfire and we left our food and went to the field. When we ran, the soldiers shot
at us” [82, p. 38]. After returning to the village, the woman was fired on again.
A defector from the Myanmar army described the indiscriminate approach toward
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shelling villages, intended to cause villagers to flee. They reported witnessing “the fir-
ing of mortars by senior soldiers. . . They were 81 mm [mortars] usually. The village was
down the mountain, and the soldiers fired into the village, and the villagers fled. It was
intended that way” [82, p.39]. Villagers indicated a belief that attacks by the Myanmar
army were indiscriminate, demonstrated by one Kachin woman who stated, “the Burmese
soldiers always think that all Kachin are KIA, they think like that. It would be very bad for
us if we were still in our village” [82, p.39].
An Amnesty International report noted that the Myanmar Army continues to use indis-
criminate violence, which “raises the concern that the Myanmar Army is failing to distin-
guish between civilian and military targets and is taking insufficient measures to minimize
civilian harm” [86, p.22]. Although in many cases the shellings do not cause fatalities be-
cause civilians are able to flee at the beginning of the attacks, the army “also appears to have
taken no or insufficient precautions to minimize civilian harm, including by, for example,
having spotters ensure that shells are falling only on intended, lawful military targets; or
firing with lines of sight such that, should the shell go long or short of the intended target,
civilians would not be at risk” [86, p.23]. According to the Amnesty International report,
“deliberate targeting appeared less common than indiscriminate or disproportionate fire”
[86, p.24].
2.3.2 Patterns of Displacement
Since the ceasefire breakdown in 2011, over 100,000 civilians have been displaced through-
out Kachin State, within approximately 120 camps for internally displaced people [87]. The
displacement generally occurs due to military operations near villages, and not necessarily
village clearance operations [86]. The majority of displaced people remain in Myanmar,
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while some crossed the border into China’s Yunnan province [88]. Civilians move to camps
in safer areas accessible from their villages, often sorting along religious lines because re-
ligious groups are a critical focal point in the coordination of aid in the Non-Government
Controlled Area (NGCA) of Kachin State. Families often split during the displacement
process, leading to female-headed households [89]. Men leave for work across the border
with China or to work in the mining sector in other parts of Kachin State. Others leave the
household to serve in the Kachin Independence Army. There is often sorting involved in
the decision to relocate to a camp: for example, one camp that could have been surveyed
for the study is populated almost entirely by the Lisu ethnic group. The majority of camps
have over 100 residents [90].
Within IDP camps, and despite the efforts of local humanitarian organizations, con-
ditions are inadequate. Currently, foreign aid organizations are not allowed access to the
NGCA, and thus, the bulk of aid provision is done by local humanitarian organizations [86].
According to Fortify Rights, throughout Kachin State displaced populations experience de-
privations in “adequate food, healthcare, shelter, essential items, water, and sanitation” [74,
p.33]. Due to the lack of available aid, some have reported that IDPs have occasionally
engaged in portering and human trafficking in order to survive [86]. The shelters that IDPs
reside in vary from camp to camp but are often constructed of basic materials and fami-
lies often share a 2.5 meter by 2.5 meter single room. “Block” shelters may be shared by
multiple families [87]. IDPs are also encountered with food shortages and sometimes must
ration food to feed their entire family [74].
Despite these conditions, IDPs generally have limited opportunities to return to their
villages even during periods of peace. The continued presence of armed forces and land-
mines have made return unsafe and forced IDPs to continue living in camps. Moreover,
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attacks by the Myanmar Army often destroy villages and re-appropriate land to companies
and outsiders. This problem is exacerbated by the lack of land documentation in rural areas
[75]. The result is a situation in which IDPs do not see leaving camps as an option in the
near future: recent data shows that over 90% of IDPs wish to return home, but nearly 80%
answered that they did not know when they expect to return [87].
2.4 Research Design and Data
2.4.1 Data collection
The data used in this study comes from an original survey implemented in IDP camps in
Kachin State, Myanmar, in 2019. Data was collected from five camps near the city Mai
Ja Yang by enumerators from Myitkyina and Mai Ja Yang. All respondents are internally
displaced people. The camps vary in size, with some having several hundred residents
to others having several thousand. Interviews were conducted with a household head.
Camps were not randomly selected. Instead, they were selected to guarantee access and
enumerator safety. The selection of camps is further described in the Appendix. Before
the survey was administered, permission to conduct the survey was attained from camp
leadership committees. Within camps, all households were sampled in order to generate
social network data. Informed consent was obtained from each respondent before the sur-
vey was administered, and enumerators were instructed to halt the survey at respondents’
request. Data was collected from 647 households. After data cleaning, 635 observations
remain.2 The research design, ethical considerations, and the sampling approach are further
2Observations were dropped if the respondent was not an adult, if the respondent gave impossible answers,
such as reporting having been killed by state forces, or if the respondent could not be distinguished in the
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Figure 2.3: Map of survey area and pre-displacement villages of respondents.
described in the Appendix.
The decision to focus on IDPs in camps, rather than on victims of violence who did
not move locations or victims who moved to other villages, was made for three primary
reasons. First, as noted above, displacement into camps is typical in the study location; in
early 2020 nearly 100,000 IDPs were in IDP specific sites [91]. Second, all respondents in
the survey were displaced, allowing the analysis to focus directly on exposure to violence,
rather than the bundled treatment of both exposure to violence and displacement. Third,
camps function as a controlled social environment in which (i) all possible respondents
are forced to adjust to a new social environment and (ii) a large amount of the universe of
possible social ties are able to be determined.
The characteristics of the respondents are shown in Table 2.1. Figure 2.3 shows the
location of the IDP camps surveyed and the villages that respondents were displaced from.3
social network. More information on how the social networks were constructed is available in the Appendix.
3The map was constructed by fuzzy-matching reported village names to villages in the Census. The
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The green triangle denotes Mai Ja Yang, the city around which all camps were located.
IDPs came from a multitude of villages concentrated on the eastern border of Kachin State.
Statistic Min Median Max Mean St. Dev.
Age 18 43 90 44.730 15.900
Female? 0 1 1 0.856 0.351
Married? 0 1 1 0.930 0.255
Baptist? 0 1 1 0.521 0.500
Catholic? 0 0 1 0.459 0.499
Above primary education? 0 1 1 0.538 0.499
Jinghpaw? 0 1 1 0.816 0.387
Leader in village? 0 0 1 0.062 0.241
Table 2.1: Summary statistics for individual-level covariates.
2.4.2 Outcomes: Network measures
The primary outcomes in this study are measures of social network ties. Formally, a net-
work is depicted as a graph g, which contains nodes (the respondents to the survey) and
edges (or ties), which represent if two nodes are connected in the network. The edges be-
tween nodes are represented in an adjacency matrix of size n× n, where a 1 in the matrix
means an edge exists and a 0 means it does not. I consider directed graphs, where an edge
between i and j, noted as ij ∈ g can exist while ji /∈ g.
Because information sharing is a crucial function of social networks in developing con-
texts, I measure communication networks within the camps. For the different network
types, IDPs were asked to list contacts with whom they communicate the most. Important
village variable used in the analysis is based on hand-coding by a research assistant.
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in defining these ties is the focus on frequency of communication: the ties represent salient
relationships and facilitate the spread of information, rumors, and gossip throughout the
camps. In this way, the ties represent a combination of frequency of contact and mutual
confiding, two aspects of ties representing ‘strength’ as defined by Granovetter [92]. A lack
of these ties may inhibit the spread of information necessary for recovery from the conflict
and may also represent a lack of strong ties necessary for sharing and cooperation to take
place. While frequency of communication is not the only suitable measure of strong ties, it
allows consistent measure of the social contacts of the IDPs as frequency of communication
is a heuristic that allows IDPs to quickly rank their ties.
In the survey, respondents were asked about several types of social ties in the IDP camp.
In this study, I examine three types of networks: ties that existed before they came to the
camp, ties formed in the camp, and their overall close ties in the camp. Networks were
elicited using the name generator approach, where respondents were asked to name their
ties, without reference to a list or census. For each network, they could name up to 5 ties.
The initial ties network is measured by the question: “Can you tell me up to 5 people
from your village you communicate with the most in this camp?”. The number of potential
edges for this network is much smaller than the others because edges can only exist between
those from the same village. The new ties network is measured by the question: “Can you
tell me up to 5 people you communicate with most in the camp with whom you did not
communicate before coming here?”. The close ties network is measured by the question:
“Can you tell me up to 5 people you communicate with most within the camp?”. Across the
three camps, the median number of names listed was 11. 159 of 635 respondents named
the complete 15 people. Because the number of names that could be listed was limited,
ties represent the first names that came to the mind of the respondent, and so may be their
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Table 2.2: Network Summary Statistics.
Network Num. Dyads Num. Edges Prop. Edges Num. Mutual Edges
Initial Ties Network 9496 245 0.0258 48
New Network 136162 439 0.0032 64
Close Ties Network 136162 457 0.0034 64
more salient ties in the camp, but the sum of the ties may not represent their outdegree in
the ‘true’ social network in which all names could be perfectly remembered by respondents
and elicited by enumerators.
All networks are nested within camps, meaning there cannot be ties across camps or
with people who are not residing in the IDP camps. The initial ties network is more limited:
ties can only exist if respondents noted in the survey that they came from the same prior
village or original village. More details about the social network construction are available
in the Appendix.
To construct the network, I use directed edges. An edge (noted Lij) exists if individual
i named individual j in the survey, but the existence of Lij does not imply the existence of
Lji. In total, I construct 15 networks: the three network types defined above for each of the
five IDP camps. Summary statistics for the three network types, with the camps pooled,
are available in Table 2.2. Figure 2.4 shows an example network: the close ties network for
camp 1. Network plots for all 15 networks are shown in the Appendix. Information on the
number of names given by respondents is in the Appendix.
All networks created are closed networks, in that the data includes only those surveyed
and excludes those named by respondents but not surveyed. This approach is necessary
to conduct the edge-level empirical approaches below, as data is necessary on both the ego
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Figure 2.4: Network of close ties for camp 1.
Table 2.3: Degree Summary Statistics.
Network Mean Degree SD Degree Min Degree Median Degree Max Degree
Initial Ties Degree 0.7717 1.370 0 0 8
New Ties Degree 1.3984 1.701 0 1 10
Close Ties Degree 1.4551 1.827 0 1 10
and the alter, and follows past work on networks [93]. Moreover, this approach can be more
accurate in predicting ‘real’ ties, as the alters are confirmed to be real people, preventing
measurement error in which egos list ties that do not truly exist.
Due to the sampling and network construction approach, the networks are sparse. In-
deed many respondents have 0 degree in the closed networks. Degree summary statistics
are shown in Table 2.3. This is due to several factors: while an effort was made to sample
every household in every camp, some households were never reachable. Moreover, only
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one respondent was interviewed per household, meaning many alters stated by respondents
were not interviewed.4 Thus, the network summary statistics presented here are not the
‘true’ network statistics due to measurement error. However, this does not bias the edge
and node-level analysis so long as missing alters are not correlated with exposure to vio-
lence. This would be the case if, for example, those who reported experiencing violence
were more likely to name alters who were not interviewed by enumerators. However, there
is little reason to believe that this sort of bias was present in the study.
The primary outcome studied at the node-level in this essay is degree in the three net-
work types, which is the sum of respondents’ outward and inward ties. I provide results for
outdegree and indegree separately in the Appendix.
2.4.3 Independent Variables: Exposure to Violence
Exposure to violence is measured in two ways: on the extensive and intensive margins.
On the extensive margin, exposure to violence is a binary variable that captures whether
a respondent reported that state forces attacked their village and that they were present
when the violence took place.5 Thus, the comparison group is either those who came from
villages that were not directly attacked by the state or those that fled their villages before
the violence began. Respondents were specifically asked: “Was your village attacked by
4This was a design choice necessitated by the limitations of conducting research in non-government-
controlled IDP camps. Enumerators could not stay in the camps past daylight hours and thus would inevitably
not be able to interview all members of households.
5I focus solely on state-inflicted violence for survey implementation reasons. Because the data was col-
lected in the Non-Government Controlled Area (NGCA) controlled by the Kachin Independence Organiza-
tion, respondents may not have been able to be truthful about their exposure to violence inflicted by non-states
actors, and eliciting responses to such questions could have placed respondents or enumerators in danger.
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states forces?” and “If your village was attacked, did you leave the village before or after
it was attacked?”. Respondents who answered “Yes” and “After” are coded as exposed.
Ultimately, 244 respondents are coded as exposed, and 387 as not exposed.
I also examine the effects of violence on the intensive margin, where the sample is
the group of IDPs that reported having their village attacked and being present during the
attacks. The size of this sample is 244 respondents. Respondents were asked about their
experiences of different forms of violence, including arrest, injury, sexual violence, torture,
disappearance or killing by Myanmar state forces. For each of these possible experiences,
they were asked if they had heard about it happening, whether it happened to a family
member, whether they witnessed it, or whether it happened to them. The respondent could
choose multiple options from this list. Respondents are coded as directly experiencing
violence if their home was destroyed, if the respondent or their family member was directly
exposed to a form of violence listed above, or if the respondent witnessed a form of violence
listed above. In this sample, 190 respondents report directly experiencing violence, and 52
do not.
2.5 Empirical strategy
2.5.1 Selection on observables
First, to determine the effect of exposure to violence on the extensive margin on the number
of ties an IDP has in a network, I use a selection on observables approach, conditioning on
covariates that are unbalanced between exposed and non-exposed IDPs. I show balance
on these variables below. Two variables predict exposure to violence: education level and
being of the Jinghpaw ethnic subgroup and are thus conditioned on in the regressions.
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This approach assumes that IDPs had similar likelihoods of being exposed to violence,
conditional on observable characteristics. I use ordinary least squares, with the regression
equation
Yi = βei + γXi + ηc + εv
where Yi is the number of ties individual i has in the network, ei denotes whether an IDP
was exposed to violence or not, X is a vector of unbalanced pre-treatment covariates, γ is a
vector of unbalanced covariate effects, η is a vector of camp fixed effects, and ε is an error
term clustered at the pre-displacement village level. I discuss identification assumptions
for this strategy below.
I also conduct analysis with a sample of the data that reported being in an attacked vil-
lage while violence was occurring, testing the effect of direct exposure to violence. For this
approach, I use a pre-displacement village fixed effects strategy, where I compare respon-
dents from the same villages who were directly exposed to violence or not. This approach
has several benefits: first, it accounts for the possible selection of villages into exposure to
violence, and it does not compare IDPs who fled before violence to those who fled after
violence. Moreover, one fear in eliciting exposure to violence based on a survey is that
IDPs will not report truthfully and under-report or over-report based on their ideological
leanings. Using this sample accounts for this possibility because all IDPs reported at least
a baseline level of exposure to violence. However, a concern with this approach is power:
only 244 respondents are included in this sample, and the direct exposure to violence may
not be a strong treatment considering that all members of this sample were present when
violence occurred.
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For this approach, I use ordinary least squares, with the regression equation
Yi = βAi + ηv + εv
where Yi is the outcome of interest for individual i, Ai is the indicator of experiencing
violence, ηv is a vector of village fixed-effects, and εv is an error term clustered at the pre-
displacement village level. I do not include covariates in this regression because none were
unbalanced between those directly exposed to violence and those not. The results of the
balance test are shown below.
2.5.2 Selection into treatment
The two empirical approaches require different assumptions about why some villages and
IDPs were exposed to violence and others were not. To identify the effect of violence on
the extensive margin, it cannot be the case that certain villages were targeted by the state
due to the characteristics of their social networks. To identify the effect of violence on
the intensive margin, it cannot be that certain civilians within villages were systematically
targeted by the state due to their social status. I defend the assumptions that this targeting
did not occur in three ways: first, I discuss qualitative evidence supporting the interpretation
that violence was not targeted at certain villages or villagers. Second, as noted above, I
show and discuss the results of balance tests for the two empirical strategies below. Third,
after presenting the results I argue and provide evidence against six alternative explanations.
To identify the effect of exposure at the extensive margin, it must be that villages were
not systematically targeted for violence by the Myanmar military due to the characteristics
of their social networks. Qualitative evidences supports the interpretation that, for many
of the villages in this sample, the Myanmar army did not target villages specifically, ex-
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cept when villages were in areas of strategic interest. As noted in the case description, the
Myanmar military’s primary goal in Kachin State has been to extend its reach into the ter-
ritory in order to access natural resources [75], therefore focusing on attacking strongholds
of the KIA, displacing villages in the area and causing indiscriminate damage [94]. This
has led to consistent indiscriminate violence near civilian areas. For example, on Novem-
ber 18th 2011, the Myanmar army attacked an area controlled by the KIA using mortars,
displacing over 3000 civilians from more than 20 villages [95]. Many of the IDPs in this
sample come from the villages displaced during those attacks. By February 2013, 364 vil-
lages throughout the state had been documented as partially or fully abandoned by civilians
[94]. While some villages were directly targeted, this was because they were in locations
that were strategically important for the military to control, such as key transportation ar-
eas. For example, Namsanyang town was attacked several times because it was located on
the Myitkyina-Bhamo road, [94]. Thus it does not appear that the characteristics of the vil-
lages’ communities played a role in determining which villages were exposed to violence.
Similarly, there is not evidence for the systematic targeting of certain civilians within
villages. According to a fact finding mission led by the UNHCR, “the Tatmadaw operations
in northern Myanmar are characterized by systematic attacks directed at civilians and civil-
ian objects, and indiscriminate attacks” [96, p. 12]. These findings correspond to repoting
by Amnesty International, which detailed the use of shelling in civilian areas during con-
frontations with armed groups, leading to the killing, injury, and displacement of civilians.
The use of mortars has been described as a form of ‘collective punishment’ against villages
populated primarily by ethnic minorities like the Kachin and Palaung” [86, p. 23]. Civilians
are shot and and shelled, even when fleeing from attacks. If targeting of certain civilians
occurs, it is done only based on observable characteristics, such as civilians who “belong
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to the same ethnic group or because they are considered to be of ‘fighting age’, seemingly
in an effort to dissuade civilians from becoming involved with ethnic armed organizations”
[96, p.12].
The above qualitative evidence describing the violence by the Myanmar Army against
civilians in Kachin State indicates that the army did not target villages or civilians based
on information that is not directly observable to researchers. Even in cases where civilians
were targeted based on their ethnicity or age, conditioning on these factors will allow the
identification of a treatment effect. Thus, by employing a battery of pre-treatment covari-
ates collected in the survey for the purposes of this empirical strategy, the violence can be
plausibly defended as conditionally random. To demonstrate that violence was plausibly
random across and within villages, I show the balance of covariates in Figure 2.5. The
variables chosen are those that could affect the propensity of a respondent to experience
violence. I create the balance table for the extensive margin by regressing the exposure in-
dicator on all pre-treatment covariates in separate models. For the intensive margin, I do the
same while including pre-displacement village level fixed effects. The evidence supports
the interpretation that villages and civilians were not systematically targeted: while IDPs
of the Jinghpaw ethnic subgroup and more educated IDPs are less likely to be exposed to
violence on the extensive margin, all covariates are balanced for exposure on the intensive
margin. I condition on the unbalanced covariates in the primary regression models.
2.5.3 Dyadic regression
Along with the selection-on-observables approach, I employ dyadic regression for two rea-
sons. First, I use it to test the robustness of the results of the individual-level approach to
measures of uncertainty that take into account dependence across dyads sharing a unit in
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Figure 2.5: Balance plot for exposure to violence on both the extensive and intesive margin.
The same covariates are used in both plots. Unbalanced covariates are shown in blue. For
the extensive margin, two variables are unbalanced: those of the Jinghpaw ethnic subgroup
and those who are educated are less likely to have been exposed. For the intensive margin,
all covariates are balanced.
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common [97, 69].6 In the first regression, I determine the effect of exposure to violence
within a dyad on the probability of that dyad forming a tie.7. The regression takes the form
Yij = α + β(ei + ej > 0) + ηc + εij
where Yij takes a value of 1 if an tie exists in a dyad and 0 otherwise, and ei denotes whether
i was exposed to violence. ηc is a vector of camp fixed effects, and εij is the error term. All
dyads within camps are considered as potential ties. I employ standard errors corrected for
dyadic correlation suggested by Fafchamps and Gubert [69]. These results are shown in
the Appendix and are consistent with the results of the selection on observables approach.
Second, I employ dyadic regression to understand whether those exposed to violence
exhibit homophily in their tie formation in their new tie networks. First, I determine
whether having the same exposure level in the dyad affects tie formation. I estimate the
following regression:
Yij = α + β1(ei = ej) + ηc + εij
Here, β1 captures the effect of both members of a dyad having the same exposure status. I
then estimate whether the type of exposure status drives this result, with the regression
Yij = α + β1(ei + ej = 0) + β2(ei + ej = 2) + ηc + εij
In this setup, β1 captures the effect of neither member in a dyad being exposed, and β2
captures the effect of both dyads being exposed.
6I employ it for the new ties and close ties networks. For the initial ties network, potential ties and
exposure to violence on the extensive margin are assigned at the village level, so there would not be variation.
7This analysis is conducted using the full sample, not the sample of those who were exposed to violence
on the intensive margin, in order to be able to use the full adjacency matrices from the camps.
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Figure 2.6: Effects of exposure to violence on the extensive margin on degree in the three
network types with unbalanced covariates and camp fixed effects. The unbalanced covari-
ates are education level and being of the Jinghpaw ethnic subgroup. Those exposed to
violence have lower degree in all three network types.
2.6 Results
2.6.1 Selection on observables: Extensive margin
Figure 2.6 displays the results of the selection on observables approach where the inde-
pendent variable is a binary measure of whether a respondent was from a village that was
attacked and was present during the violence. As expected, exposure to violence has a neg-
ative effect on the number of initial ties that IDPs have within the camps. Exposed IDPs
have 0.3 fewer ties when the mean number of ties for non-exposed IDPs is 0.9. Exposure
to violence also has a negative effect on the number of new ties and close ties that IDPs
have within the camps: exposed IDPs have 0.4 fewer new ties and 0.28 fewer close ties
on average. These results are robust to models conditioning on no covariates and models
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conditioning on all the covariates used in the balance test, as shown in the Appendix.8
The results indicate that, for IDPs exposed to violence on the extensive margin, (i) vio-
lence disrupts their networks that existed before displacement, and they arrive in the camp
with fewer social ties, and (ii) that they have difficulty forming ties with other IDPs after
arriving in the camps. This culminates in them having fewer overall close ties in the camps.
As shown in Figure 2.2, the lack of ties has implications for these IDPs’ welfare, increasing
their fear of walking at night and decreasing their ability to borrow from the community if
needed. However, these results could potentially be explained through mechanisms other
than exposure to violence. I now turn to evaluating the evidence for alternative explana-
tions.
2.6.2 Alternative explanations
I test the validity of this finding in six ways, the results of which are shown in Figure
2.7. First, villages might have been selected to be attacked based on their social network
structure, and the negative effects found here could be due to exposed villages having less
dense social networks. If this is the case, IDPs from villages that experienced violence
who could flee before it occurred should still have lower initial ties within the camps than
those who did not come from villages that experienced violence. To test this, I consider
the sample of IDPs who either did not report that their village was attacked or did report
that their village was attacked, but that they left before the violence occurred (n = 387).
I regress initial degree in the camps on an indicator that one came from a village that was
attacked with camp level fixed effects. I find that those who reported that their village was
attacked but left before the violence occurred have similar degree to those whose villages
8The result for close ties becomes insignificant in the model with all covariates, p = 0.1027.
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were not attacked, indicating that selection of certain villages into violence based on their
social network structure is not driving the results.
A second threat to identification is that those who fled earlier may have done so because
they had more social ties than those who did not flee. This could also explain the preceding
test because those who fled could be those who had the highest degree in low network
density villages. If this is the case, then, within villages, those who fled should have higher
indicators of pre-displacement social capital. To test this, I regress four indicators of social
capital on having left the village after violence occurred, within the sample of IDPs that
report that their village was attacked and with pre-displacement village fixed effects (n =
400). The indicators are a binary measure of whether a person would have invited more
than 80 guests to a wedding of a close relative in their village, whether their opinion was
very respected or the most respected in the village, the size of their household in the village,
and whether they were a village leader. I find no difference in these measures between those
who left before and after violence, suggesting that social capital or degree did not influence
the decision to flee early or late.
A third alternative explanation is that exposure to violence’s effect on the formation of
new ties could be explained if those coded as exposed to violence arrived in the camps later
on average than those who were not exposed and thus had less time to integrate themselves
into the camps. This is possible, as, at least within villages, those who were present during
violence would have stayed longer in their villages than those who fled beforehand by
definition. To test this, I regress respondent’s reported days since arriving in the camp on
the exposure variable along with unbalanced covariates and camp fixed effects, clustering
standard errors at the pre-displacement village level. I find that exposure to violence has no
effect on the number of days that IDPs have been in the camps, suggesting that time in the
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Figure 2.7: Results of six tests of alternative explanations for the effects of exposure to
violence on degree in the three network types. There is no evidence that the findings were
driven by: attacked villages having less dense social networks, those fleeing earlier having
higher pre-displacement social capital, those who were exposed to violence having spent
less time in the camps, attacked villages having smaller populations, differential measure-
ment error in constructing the networks, or those who were exposed to violence having less
family members in the camps.
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camp is not the mechanism explaining the lack of new ties.
A fourth alternative explanation is that exposure to violence’s effect on initial ties could
be explained if smaller villages were systematically targeted by the state for exposure to
violence. If this was the case, then those exposed to violence would have smaller initial
networks simply because they had a smaller initial population of co-villagers. To test this,
I construct counts of the number of IDPs surveyed from each village and regress this on the
exposure to violence variable using the same model as above. I show that those exposed to
violence do not have smaller populations of co-villagers on average.
Fifth, to show that the effects are not driven by differential measurement error in con-
structing the camp networks, I also use the number of names listed for each network as a
dependent variable. This measure does not exclude the names of non-surveyed IDPs listed
by respondents from the counts. This is not as thorough of a measure as degree, as it does
not capture the number of others naming a respondent as a tie, and it can suffer from ceil-
ing effects. Nevertheless, using the same regression setup as for the degree outcomes, I
find that those exposed to violence listed fewer names in all network types, suggesting the
findings are not driven by how the networks are constructed.
Sixth, to show that the results for initial ties and close ties are not solely driven by those
exposed to violence having less family members in the camps, and instead have difficulty
in forming ties, I examine whether those exposed to violence name less family members
in their initial and close ties networks than the unexposed. When eliciting alters for these
two networks, respondents were asked, for each name given, if they were related to the
person. I construct counts of the number of relatives named as dependent variables. If
those exposed to violence name less relatives as alters, this could indicate that the effect of
violence operates mechanically by removing relatives from the network. Conversely, if the
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number of relatives named is similar, then this would indicate that the difference in network
sizes is driven by ties outside of the immediate family. I find that exposure to violence has
no effect on the number of relatives named for either network as a count and that it increases
the ratio of relatives named to total names for the close ties network, suggesting that those
exposed to violence tend to have more relatives in their close ties, perhaps because of their
inability to form new ties outside of the family.
2.6.3 Selection on observables: Intensive margin
Having established that exposure to violence on the extensive margin leads victims to have
fewer initial ties, new ties, and close ties in the camps, I then turn to estimating the effect
of violence on the intensive margin. Figure 2.8 shows the effects of directly experiencing
violence on degree in the three network types. There appears only to be an effect on new
tie formation: those who directly experience violence have 0.77 fewer ties than those who
did not. The null result for initial ties is surprising but could be explained by the fact that
these networks are within villages. In small villages it is possible to know everyone such
that if any member left the network, every other person would have fewer ties. However,
the result for new ties suggests that those who directly experience violence have more
difficulty forming ties, despite all respondents in the sample being present for violence.
This is consistent with the interpretation that the traumatic effects of violence increase
with the severity of violence as established in past studies [62]. Thus, IDPs who directly
experience violence have the greatest difficulty in forming new ties. These results are robust
to conditioning on all covariates included in the balance tests, shown in the Appendix.
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Figure 2.8: Effects of exposure to violence on the intensive margin on degree in the three
network types with pre-displacement village fixed effects. Covariates were balanced be-
tween those exposed and not exposed, so I do not condition on any. Those directly affected
by violence have fewer new ties.
2.6.4 Mechanisms
The above analysis showed that exposure to violence on both the extensive and intensive
margins led IDPs to have fewer new ties in the camps. Earlier I argued that exposure
to violence could have counteracting effects on tie formation: it could negatively affect tie
formation through trauma while increasing the incentives to establish strong social support.
Here, I evaluate whether there is evidence consistent with these mechanisms.
To determine whether there is evidence consistent with the trauma mechanism, I evalu-
ate whether exposed IDPs display more fear in general and fear of armed conflict relative to
non-exposed IDPs. Fear of recurrence of a traumatic event is a delayed response to trauma
[98]. I regress two indicators of fear on exposure to violence at both the extensive and
intensive margins with the same models as above: the first is whether a respondent reports
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Figure 2.9: Effect of exposure to violence on measures of trauma and value in ties mech-
anisms. The results are consistent with the trauma mechanism but not the value in ties
mechanism.
being at least somewhat afraid to walk alone at night. The second is whether a respondent
strongly agrees with the statement, “I feel a threat to myself or my belongings due to armed
conflict.” The results are shown in the first chart of Figure 2.9.9 Consistent with the trauma
mechanism, IDPs exposed on both the extensive and intensive margins display increased
fear relative to their comparison groups.
I then turn to evaluating the value in ties mechanism. Although there was a negative
total effect of exposure to violence on new tie formation, this positive mechanism may
9The dependent variables are coded in this way to preserve variation. 324 responded that they were at
least somewhat afraid to walk alone at night, and 311 did not. 175 responded that they strongly agreed with
the statement ”I feel a threat to myself or my belongings due to armed conflict” while 442 did not. 330 stated
that they agreed with the statement.
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still be present but outweighed by the negative effects. To evaluate this, first, I determine
whether exposed IDPs lost more during the displacement process than non-exposed IDPs,
indicating that they might need more social support. I regress a measure of the difference
in income before and after displacement on both measures of exposure to violence.10 The
second chart of Figure 2.9 shows that there is not an effect of exposure to violence on
this measure, suggesting that those exposed to violence did not lose significantly more as-
sets than those not exposed. I then evaluate whether exposed IDPs value ties more than
non-exposed IDPs. To do this, I construct two measures: the first is whether a respondent
believes that sharing can make their situation more secure, and the second is whether the
respondent believes that strengthening the community in the camps can improve their ca-
pacity to deal with bad events.11 The results are shown in the third chart of Figure 2.9;
exposure to violence does not affect either measure. This indicates that those exposed to
violence do not find more value in ties than the non-exposed.
2.6.5 Dyadic regression: Homophily
Having established that exposure to violence degrades victims’ social networks, I then
turn to understanding how ties are formed in the camps. Figure 2.10 displays the results
of the two regression models to understand if new ties exhibit homophily with regards to
exposure to violence. The first plot indicates that ties in dyads with the same exposure
to status are more likely to form than ties between those with different exposure statuses.
These ties are 0.13% more likely to exist, a 53% increase from the comparison. However,
10I subtract pre-displacement monthly income from current monthly income, so a negative result indicates
a loss of income following displacement.
11A large majority of IDPs answered ’yes’ to both questions.
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Figure 2.10: Results of dyadic regression with camp fixed effects and standard errors cor-
rected for network dependence. Ties in dyads with the same exposure status are more
likely, but this is driven by dyads in which neither member was exposed to violence.
the second plot shows that this is not driven by those exposed to violence being more likely
to form ties with one another: while dyads in which neither individual was exposed to
violence are more likely to form ties, dyads in which both individuals were exposed form
ties at a similar rate to dyads in which only one individual was exposed. The fact that
dyads with two exposed members form ties at similar rates to dyads with only one exposed
member suggests that either the effect of trauma as a mediator does not increase with the
number of exposed members in a dyad or that the positive effects of preferences to form ties
with other exposed individuals counteracts the additional negative effect of another dyad
member being exposed. However, with the data available, it is not possible to disentangle
which of these interpretations is correct.
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2.7 Conclusion
Civilians who are displaced during armed conflict are forced to re-establish their lives in
new locations. Social networks serve as a financial and emotional support system in this
process, allowing victims to cope with and recover from the conflict. However, violence
transforms these networks. In this study, I show that exposure to violence shrinks the initial,
new, and close ties that IDPs exposed to violence have in their IDP camps, and experiencing
higher levels of violence than other exposed IDPs further decreases the ability to form new
ties. Evaluations of the mechanisms support trauma as a critical mediating variable.
Moreover, I show that these effects are not due to IDPs selecting new ties based on
shared experiences of violence. Instead, those not exposed to violence are likely to form
ties with one another, whereas those exposed form ties with both types at significantly
lower rates. This suggests that camp social networks are dominated by those not exposed
to violence and therefore may not provide necessary support to those who have suffered
the most.
The findings indicate that even in the long-term and in an environment conducive to
social integration, those exposed to violence fail to catch-up to non-exposed IDPs in terms
of social ties. The effects of violence may be even larger in settings where integration
is more difficult, such as camps with more heterogeneity among their members, in cities
where most citizens are not displaced, or in countries where refugees and long-standing
citizens do not share the same home country. Further research is needed to understand how
these conditions interact.
In terms of welfare, The findings indicate that the most vulnerable in IDP camps may
also have the lowest amount of social protection. This has implications for policymaking
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regarding the protection of IDPs: although all members of IDP camps need and deserve
aid, special attention must be paid to those who directly experienced violence and thus
may have less access to social support within the camp. Especially in times of income
shocks, when conflict flares up, a drought occurs, or a natural disaster strikes, these victims
will require extra aid.
The study is a step forward in approaches to measuring the integration of the displaced.
While collecting detailed social network data may be prohibitively costly in other settings,
advances in employing cell-phone data [56] and online social network data [99] could be
leveraged in other settings to gain a more nuanced picture of the success of different IDPs
in integrating. Social networks play a vital role in the ability of the displaced to persevere,
and a greater understanding of how they evolve in response to displacement and violence
is necessary.
However, it is important to note four conditions of the study location that may affect
these results’ generalizability. First, the study took place within camps for the internally
displaced. This means that all respondents were forced to integrate into a new community,
making integration more straightforward as all had incentives to replace lost ties. Second,
the study’s location in an area of active conflict means that all respondents are familiar
with the violence of war and feel some threat due to the conflict. Only 10% of respondents
disagreed with the statement, “I feel a threat to myself or my belongings due to armed
conflict.” This common threat may lead to higher rates of tie formation than in places where
such a sentiment is not shared. Third, the camps were relatively homogeneous in terms of
ethnicity and religion, whereas in other locations, IDPs and refugees may not resemble the
people they can form new ties with to the same extent. Fourth, while a large majority of
respondents stated that they believed that they would be able to return home in the future,
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the camps surveyed here have existed for many years, and the end of the conflict is still
not in sight. Because the camps are permanent in the short-term, IDPs may have more
incentives to invest in their local social networks. In other locations where return may
be more likely in the short-term, IDPs may not invest in forming new ties. Despite these
limitations, this study is an important first step in understanding the effects of exposure to
violence on social networks.
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Conflict and social integration among the forcibly displaced:
Theory and evidence from Ukraine
3.1 Introduction
At the end of 2019, 79.5 million people had been forcibly displaced from their homes [100].
Of this number, 45.7 million were displaced within their own countries (internally displaced
people, or IDPs). For many of these people, displacement has become protracted, such that
they are unable to return to their location of origin but also unable to reduce their vulner-
ability in new locations [101]. Along with return or resettlement, one durable solution to
protracted displacement is local integration, where the displaced become stable, long-term
members of their new communities [17, 18]. States and international organizations have,
in many settings, crafted policies to facilitate this outcome However, holding displacement
location and policies constant, there still exists variation in the ability of displaced people
to successfully integrate. What explains this variation?
This study seeks to understand the effects of exposure to violence on the ability of in-
ternally displaced people in Ukraine to integrate into their new communities. Past research
on the integration of new community members has focused largely on the supply-side of
integration, seeking to determine how specific policies [e.g. 19, 20, 102, 103, 104, 105,
6, 106, 107, 108] and characteristics of the receiving community [e.g. 21, 22, 23, 109,
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110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118] shape integration success. Such a focus is
well-founded: political processes such as citizenship and birthright policies, along with
cultural factors such as languages, norms, and customs, shape the paths to integration for
the outsider groups.
However, while this research agenda has made great strides in improving our under-
standing of how supply-side changes can improve integration outcomes for groups of mi-
grants, less is known about the factors that lead to variation in integration outcomes holding
the host community and institutional setting constant. The focus on external factors ignores
the agency of refugees and IDPs in integration. Even when host communities are recep-
tive to migrants and institutional barriers to inclusion are low, migrants must still choose
to pursue integration. For example, in recent IOM data from Ukraine only 50% of IDPs
claimed to be fully integrated into their local community [119]. The aim of this study is
to understand the factors that drive this variation. Why do some displaced people seek to
integrate while others do not?
To answer this question, I introduce and test a demand-side theory of integration using
the case of internally displaced people in Ukraine. I study a simple decision-theoretic
model of integration following Fouka [19], focusing on variation among the displaced
rather than variation among external policies or the characteristics of host communities.
I posit that two factors outside of the institutional environment shape the desire of an IDP
to integrate: their projected length of stay in a new community, and psychological factors
caused by trauma experienced during the displacement process. I argue that exposure to
violence during the conflict affects the ability of IDPs to integrate through these pathways.
I empirically evaluate the theory using original survey data from the population of IDPs
in Ukraine. With this data, I employ a fixed-effects strategy at the pre-displacement locality
51
Chapter 3. Conflict and social integration among the forcibly
displaced: Theory and evidence from Ukraine
level to identify the effects of exposure to violence. The results show that those directly
exposed to violence, either by being directly harmed or by being physically present while
a family or household member was harmed, are less successful in integrating into their
new communities. Moreover, using a causal mediation approach, I show that the results
are consistent with a psychological mechanism: those directly exposed to violence are
more likely to exhibit symptoms associated with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD),
and PTSD negatively affects integration.
The findings of this research make three contributions to the understanding of opti-
mal policy approaches towards promoting integration. First, along with recent research
on refugee return [120], this research focuses on the agency of the forcibly displaced by
evaluating the effects of their displacement experiences on integration, rather than on the
effects of policies directed towards them. The research shows that the outcome of migrant
integration efforts can be shaped by characteristics of IDPs themselves instead of being
driven solely by the attitudes of host communities and policies of receiving-country gov-
ernments. This suggests that to successfully accomplish ‘last mile’ integration and bring
the most vulnerable closer to the state, aid and governmental organizations must pay atten-
tion to variation in the needs of migrants, along with high-level policy changes. Second, it
shows that exposure to violence can be a significant factor shaping the ability of migrants
to successfully integrate: those exposed to violence were much more likely to feel like
an outsider, feel isolated in their communities, and to believe that they didn’t have local
contacts they could rely on for help. Special attention must be paid to this group. Third, I
find evidence consistent with trauma being a key mechanism preventing integration. This
suggests that a focus on mental health services for the displaced may be a fruitful approach
towards closing the gap.
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This research also contributes to three strands of literature on the effects of exposure
to violence and conflict. First, it builds on a large literature examining the relationship be-
tween exposure to violence and social behavior [47, 121, 122, 123, 48]. While a multitude
of studies have shown that exposure to violence can promote pro-social behavior, I find
that those exposed to violence have the hardest time finding community in new locations.
This suggests a possible instrumental mechanism for increased pro-social behavior: those
exposed to violence may act in a more pro-social way because they have fundamental dif-
ficulties in forming new social relations. Second, the findings suggest a mechanism behind
recent findings that among the displaced, those exposed to violence are more likely to ex-
press preferences for peace [124]. I show that this group of forced migrants has less ability
to form lasting ties in their new communities, suggesting they would benefit the most from
attaining peace and facilitating their return home. Thus, one would expect this group to
express preferences for peace rather than possible further violence. Third, it contributes
to the understanding of where and how ‘war makes the state’ [12]. While conflict may
enable the growth of the state at the institutional level, the finding that exposure to violence
reduces integration indicates that war can also undermine social cohesion and capital at
the micro-level. For a state to rebuild and grow after conflict, it must ‘bring the state’ to
conflict-exposed IDPs by focusing on enabling their integration into local communities.
The essay proceeds as follows. The next section defines and discusses the importance of
social integration. I then introduce a model of IDP integration to produce testable implica-
tions based on exposure to violence as an independent variable. Following this, I introduce
the case of displacement in Ukraine. I then introduce the data and empirical strategy, fol-
lowed by a presentation and discussion of the results. The last section concludes.
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3.2 The importance of social integration
Social integration is a difficult concept to define and measure. Abstractly, integration can
be defined as full participation in society, without barriers [125]. It differs from assimila-
tion, in that cultural distinctiveness can still exist after integration has been achieved [115].
In terms of indicators, integration can be measured through behavior: through active em-
ployment, engaging in social activities, and developing relationships among new contacts
[105]. A recent study measures social integration in several ways: plans to remain in the
country, experiences of discrimination, membership, and participation in social clubs, and
reading a newspaper in the country’s language [6]. The use of these measures demonstrates
the difficulty in measuring integration. Although each of these measures may capture some
aspect of integration, one can imagine an immigrant who plans to remain in their cur-
rent location, does not experience discrimination, participates in a club largely made up of
other immigrants, and reads the newspaper. This person may not feel integrated but would
be considered as such by these measures. Moreover, while some measures of integration
may capture the relevant behaviors perfectly in some settings, they may not apply in other
cases. Progress on measurement has been made recently in the context of refugee inte-
gration, notably through the development of the IPL integration index [126]. However, the
measurement of integration may vary widely between refugee and IDP settings: IDPs often
already are capable of navigating the linguistic and cultural barriers of their new locations
upon arrival, but still do not report having achieved integration.
However, despite difficulties of measurement, understanding what allows integration
to occur and methods for promoting it is clearly important. As Hainmueller, Hangartner,
and Pietrantuono [6] note, “social integration opens the door to economic mobility, civic
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engagement, and political participation and thereby improves the lives of immigrants and
helps to unlock their potential to contribute to the host country society and economy”.
Past studies have shown that achieving measures of integration, such as cultural education,
language experience, and social contacts with locals can improve employment and occu-
pational status [127]. For IDPs, integration allows them to create networks of support and
trust in new places thereby promoting recovery from violence and displacement. Social in-
tegration becomes even more important in contexts where migrants have lost some of their
social network contacts, as would be expected in situations of conflict or disaster. People
rely on social relations for fundamental things like gaining information, mutual insurance,
and sharing, which become even more important during recovery.
3.3 A model of demand for integration
This section introduces a simple decision-theoretic framework for understanding the demand-
side calculation of IDP integration. Internally displaced people must actively seek out in-
tegration to accomplish it. Holding institutional barriers and community responses fixed,
there remains variation at the individual level in the desire and capacity of IDPs to integrate
themselves into a new community. Attempting to form new relationships in a community
is costly, requiring time, effort, and willingness to engage in uncomfortable and unfamiliar
social settings. IDPs will only choose to integrate if the benefits from integration outweigh
the costs of this effort.
To illustrate the integration decision of IDPs I follow the general setup of Fouka [19].
IDPs can exert effort e to integrate at cost c(e). The costs of integration are the economic
and psychological toll taken by engaging in new social settings. For instance, joining
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new community groups, clubs, and professional organizations, participating in community
events, and pursuing hobbies requires investments of both time and money that could be
spent elsewhere. Psychologically, pursuing integration requires engaging in potentially
awkward social environments and adapting to cultures and norms different from those to
which one is accustomed to.
The payoff to successfully integrating is δt where δ > 0 is the every-period payoff to
integration and t is a measure of the length of time an IDP intends to remain in their new
community. δ is a measure of the intrinsic benefits of being part of a community, such
as access to information, informal insurance, and job prospects. The payoff to integration
increases with an IDP’s time horizons because the benefits to being in a community should
continue as long as the IDP remains; information and informal insurance, for example, are
not one-off rewards. For migrants, the results of successful integration, such as employ-
ment opportunities and membership in professional and hobby organizations, continue so
long as they are in the community. More broadly, investing in integrating into local com-
munities allows repeated interactions among social contacts to take place, securing a place
within networks and building stronger ties within social circles. As these networks become
stronger, people benefit more from their existence. Thus, the gains from integration in-
crease over time, and the expected length of stay should play a large role in the desire to
integrate. These findings have been echoed in other research: in a study of naturalization,
Hainmueller, Hangartner, and Pietrantuono [6] show that the naturalization of immigrants
increased their social integration, indicating that immigrants who have long-term security
in their new location invest more in social integration. Similarly, Bakker, Dagevos, and En-
gbersen [64] show that having a temporary residence status correlates with less integration
among refugees in the Netherlands.
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The probability of successfully integrating is P (e) where 0 ≤ P ≤ 1, Pe > 0 and
Pee < 0. For simplicity, I assume that, for IDP i, ci(e) = cie such that the cost of effort
increases linearly with the effort exerted. Thus, the objective function of an internally




Evaluating this objective function leads to two propositions of empirical interest:
Proposition 1. The effort exerted by an IDP, and thus their probability of successfully
integrating, increases with their expected length of stay in their new community.1
Proposition 2. The effort exerted by an IDP, and thus their probability of successfully
integrating, decreases with their costs of exerting effort.2
This generates the following general hypotheses which will be the focus of the empirical
evaluation of the theory:
• H1: All else equal, as an IDP’s expected length of stay in a new community increases,
the probability that they will successfully integrate increases.
• H2: All else equal, as the costs of integration effort increase, the probability that an
IDP will successfully integrate decreases.
Now, I turn to introducing exposure to violence as a factor affecting both the expected
length of stay and the cost of integration effort.
1Differentiating with respect to t I obtain P (e)δ. Differentiating with respect to e I obtain Pe(e) which is
positive by assumption, meaning e is increasing in t.
2Define s = −c such that the objective function can be written as maxe P (e)δt + s(e). Differentiating
with respect to s I obtain e, and differentiating with respect to e I obtain 1 indicating that e is increasing in s,
meaning it is decreasing in c.
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3.3.1 The effects of exposure to violence
This study focuses empirically on exposure to violence, which has theoretical effects on
IDPs’ expected length of stay in their new communities and on the costs of integration.
Exposure to violence has countervailing effects on the integration outcomes of IDPs. While
exposure to violence can cause post-traumatic stress disorder, making integration more
costly, it also can increase the length of time that IDPs expect to spend in a new community.
This section discusses both of these mechanisms.
First, exposure to violence may make successful integration less likely due to its effects
on psychological outcomes such as post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). A wide range of
studies has shown that exposure to violent events, such as those that occur during armed
conflict, can cause severe negative psychological outcomes [128, 129, 130]. Moreover,
even among those exposed to traumatic events, people who are exposed to more serious
incidents have higher levels of psychological distress: among those exposed to a common
experience of displacement, exposure to violence is associated with increased psycholog-
ical distress and trauma [38], and the likelihood of trauma increases with the severity and
recency of the violence [62, 131].
These psychological symptoms can increase the costs of socializing, and thus decrease
the likelihood of successful integration. Those with PTSD often struggle with social in-
teractions, as trauma can decrease their ability to recognize social signals and their self-
awareness and communication, among other factors [132]. PTSD can also cause emotional
numbing, leading to relationship difficulties [133]. Due to emotional numbing, those with
PTSD often lose their sense of empathy, leading to them appearing detached in relation-
ships [134]. In terms of forming new relationships, past research has shown that displaced
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people with psychological issues struggle to integrate into new communities, struggle to
adapt to new cultures, and tend to feel isolated in their new locations [39, 40, 63]. Trauma-
distress can create feelings of intergroup anxiety and insecurity in one’s community [122].
Therefore, exposure to violence may increase the costs of integrating, lowering the rate of
successful integration.
Conversely, exposure to violence can increase the returns to integration by extending
the time-horizons of IDPs in their new communities. First, experiencing violence in their
previous location can make IDPs more willing to stay in their new location by increasing
perceptions of threat in the place they experienced violence. IDPs may view their past loca-
tion as unsafe and be reluctant to return, even if return is possible. Past evidence has shown
that exposure to violence can lead to higher levels of risk aversion, which can make willing-
ness to return less likely [62]. Moreover, those exposed to traumatic events are more likely
to see themselves as vulnerable to future violence and thus are not willing to risk returning
to a violent area [135, 136, 137]. Second, violence may also make return impossible: if
shellings or other acts of violence destroyed IDPs’ property, they may not have a place to
return to. Both of these mechanisms should increase the length of stay a refugee intends to
have in their new location after being displaced. For those that have experienced the highest
levels of violence, return may be viewed as impossible until violence completely ends and
peace is achieved. Thus, exposure to violence should be associated with longer expected
lengths of stay, increasing the benefits to pursuing integration and thus the overall rate of
successful integration. Whether exposure to violence has a net positive or negative effect
on integration outcomes depends on which mechanism is stronger, and is thus an empirical
question.
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3.3.2 Empirical predictions
This section introduced a framework to understand variation among the integration of IDPs
into their new locations, holding external factors such as the institutional environment and
the response of the host community constant. I argued that the decision to pursue integra-
tion is shaped by the benefits IDPs see in it, dictated by their expected length of stay in the
new location, and the costs of integration. I then argued that exposure to violence affects
both factors. Experiencing violence increases the expected length of stay of an IDP, but
also increases the costs of integration through trauma. These predictions can be stated as
the following hypotheses and sub-hypotheses to be tested empirically:
• Hv: The total effect of exposure to violence on integration is ambiguous because
there is no a priori reason to believe that either of the following mechanisms has a
stronger effect.
• Hv1: All else equal, those exposed to violence should exhibit more psychological
trauma, and therefore be more likely to meet the criteria for Post-Traumatic Stress
Disorder (PTSD) or Complex Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (CPTSD).
• Hv2: All else equal, those exposed to violence should have longer expected stays in
their new communities.
The specific measures of the variables used to test these hypotheses are outlined in the
empirical approach section below. The next section introduces the case of IDPs in Ukraine.
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3.4 Displacement and integration in Ukraine
Forced displacement in Ukraine is primarily driven by the conflict in the East of Ukraine
between the Ukrainian military and pro-Russian forces. The conflict began in 2014, af-
ter the pro-West Maidan protests toppled the Russian-leaning government, causing former
President Viktor Yanukovych to flee the country [138]. In response, Russia refused to rec-
ognize the new pro-Western government and invaded and annexed Crimea. At the same
time, pro-Russian groups and militias formed in the East, occupying towns and demand-
ing separation. Two distinct separatist groups, the Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) and
Luhansk People’s Republic (LPR), formed, taking over major towns without substantial
opposition from the Ukrainian military. Their goal was independence from Ukraine [139].
By late spring 2014, the Ukrainian military began to effectively respond to the separatist
groups, taking back key areas such as the Donetsk airport and Port Mariupol, eventually
controlling half of the lost territory. This period ushered in the heaviest casualties of the
war, as the use of heavy weaponry and shelling disrupted both military groups and the lives
of civilians. Civilians were not directly targeted during these hostilities, but bombing often
took place in heavily populated areas. Toward the end of 2014, a ceasefire was reached
but was largely ineffective. The level of violence remained high until early 2015 when a
draft agreement was reached. This culminated in a second ceasefire in 2015. Since then,
violence has continued but at a lower level than at the onset of the conflict [140].
3.4.1 The impact of the conflict on civilians
The conflict has forcibly displaced over one million civilians from their homes, leading
Ukraine to have one of the largest IDP populations in the world since 2015. While in 2016
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nearly 1.8 million civilians were registered as IDPs in Ukraine, a further one million people
were estimated to have fled to Russia, leading to the largest European displacement crisis
since the Balkan Wars [141, 142]. While the number of IDPs has decreased since the initial
count, over 1.4 million IDPs remained registered in early 2020 [143].
In contrast to many cases of displacement, Ukrainian IDPs were not ushered into camps
or other forms of shelter [142, 144]. Instead, the majority of IDPs relocated to cities and
towns outside of the conflict zone, some settling close to the border of the occupied territo-
ries and others migrating farther to major residential areas [145]. The largest group of IDPs
lives near the conflict area. The process of displacement has been described as chaotic: it
was not streamlined by the Ukrainian government. Instead, IDPs often had to fend for
themselves or rely on the help of volunteers.
As displacement has become protracted, IDPs have faced several challenges in estab-
lishing lives in their new locations. Early on, IDPs faced some discrimination from local
populations, as they were seen as being favored by governmental programs [145]. How-
ever, discrimination has dissipated over time: in a recent survey, only 4% of IDPs reported
discrimination or being treated unfairly because of their IDP status [119]. Instead, the
largest challenge has been accessing housing. While over 90% of Ukrainian citizens own
their own homes, this rate drops to 17% among IDPs [146]. Unstable housing has a large
effect on the ability of IDPs to adapt to new environments. For example, some IDPs have
cited the risk of eviction as a factor preventing them from finding stable employment [147].
Because IDPs tend to rent their housing, they are faced with rising accommodation prices
and the possibility of eviction, increasing their feelings of insecurity and leading them to
feel unsettled [148].
Along with the lack of housing, there is a widespread prevalence of mental health dis-
62
Chapter 3. Conflict and social integration among the forcibly
displaced: Theory and evidence from Ukraine
orders among the displaced in Ukraine. Survey data from 2016 established that 32% of
IDPs had PTSD, 22% suffered from depression, and 17% had anxiety [149]. Despite this
large population in need, 74% of those requiring care were not receiving it. Some IDPs
have also had additional difficulty in integrating into the labor market because of their skill
mismatch. The occupied areas of Ukraine, before the conflict, had economies driven in
large part by heavy industries, and mining in particular. However, heavy industry is less
common elsewhere in Ukraine, and thus these displaced people have trouble finding job
opportunities that provide a similar livelihood to their work pre-displacement [150].
These factors have led to the unequal and incomplete social integration of IDPs into
their new communities. Despite several years of displacement, only 50% of IDPs reported
that they had integrated into their new communities [119]. 39% stated that they had partially




To test the theoretical predictions outlined above, I employ original survey data from an
online cross-section of IDPs within Ukraine. Data from 748 IDPs was collected between
March 21st and April 19th, 2021. Subjects were recruited using Facebook ads, using a
quota sampling approach similar to that of Zhang, Mildenberger, Howe, Marlon, Rosen-
thal, and Leiserowitz [151]. This non-probabilistic sampling method was chosen due to the
difficulty of surveying this difficult-to-reach population randomly. While an IDP registra-
tion list is maintained by the Ukrainian government, access to this list was not granted to
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the research team. Past surveys of this population have relied on time-location sampling,
in which IDPs are recruited at likely places of gathering such as NGO sites and locations
for aid distribution [149, 152, 153]. However such an approach was not suitable for this
research for two primary reasons: first, IDPs who visit such sites may be more likely to
be socially integrated because they actively visit such organizations, and thus may not be
representative of the true IDP population. Second, because the survey was fielded during
the COVID-19 pandemic, such sites were not visited as often. However, the online quota
sampling method employed here cannot resolve all concerns about selection into the sam-
ple. Specifically, IDPs without access to or knowledge of Facebook could not be sampled.
This could potentially lead to the undersampling of older IDPs and IDPs that are the most
vulnerable.
To sample the population, 150 strata were created based on region, gender, and age.
The distribution of IDPs by gender and region were acquired from UNHCR data3 and the
distribution of IDP ages was taken from survey data collected by the International Office
of Migration [119]. 95/150 strata were filled or partially filled, accounting for 95.3% of the
intended quota. Observations are weighted such that observations in each stratum account
for the correct percentage of the dataset.4 In the Appendix, I show the proportion of the
sample allocated to each stratum and the actual realized proportion after sampling. The
Facebook advertisement used to recruit subjects is shown in the Appendix as well.
Table 3.1 shows the demographic information of the sample. The sample is primarily
female and married, and a low number of the respondents have a 2-year degree or higher
from a university. The mean pre-displacement monthly income for an IDP was around
3https://www.unhcr.org/ua/en/resources/idp-dashboard
4I show in the Appendix that results are robust to using unweighted data.
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics for sample covariates.
NUnique PercentMissing Mean SD Min Median Max
Age 62 0 46.45 12.77 18.00 46.00 84.00
Male? 2 0 0.42 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00
Married? 3 2 0.62 0.48 0.00 1.00 1.00
College degree? 3 2 0.13 0.34 0.00 0.00 1.00
Pre-displacement income (10,000 UAH) 95 14 0.86 2.05 0.01 0.50 40.00
Highly social? 3 3 0.51 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00
Pre-displacement HH size 15 21 3.47 1.99 0.00 3.00 20.00
Distance from town (Meters) 240 8 1220.23 2410.80 0.00 0.00 20609.95
8550 Ukrainian Hryvnia, equivalent to about 307 USD. The mean number of household
members before displacement was 3.5.
IDPs in the sample were displaced from locations all over eastern Ukraine. Figure 3.1
shows the pre-displacement locations of the respondents and whether they were directly ex-
posed to violence. The majority of respondents were displaced from in and around Donetsk
and Luhansk, two of the major cities in the East and the location of much of the hostilities.
Exposure to violence varies across the map and is not concentrated in any one location or
town, suggesting a lack of targeting. Figure 3.2 shows the post-displacement location of
respondents. Respondents currently live throughout Ukraine but are concentrated in the
eastern government-controlled area, close to the area of conflict.
3.5.2 Measurement and key variables
The primary independent variable of interest in this study is a binary measure of expo-
sure to violence. The variable is coded 1 if a respondent responded “yes” to the question:
“Have you suffered violence, or have you been physically maimed in an attack related to
the conflict in Eastern Ukraine?” or if the respondent reported that a member of their fam-
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Figure 3.1: Map of pre-displacement locations of respondents. The majority of respondents
came from Donetsk and Luhansk, two of the major cities in the conflict zone.
66
Chapter 3. Conflict and social integration among the forcibly
displaced: Theory and evidence from Ukraine
Figure 3.2: Map of post-displacement locations of respondents. Respondents were sampled
from 21 of the 25 regions in Ukraine.
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ily or household suffered violence, or were physically maimed in an attack related to the
conflict in Eastern Ukraine and that they were present when the violence took place. For
robustness, I also employ another measure of violence that only takes the value 1 if the
respondent reports being personally physically harmed. Summary statistics for exposure
to violence are shown in Table 3.2. 24% of the sample reports being exposed to violence,
with 19% being personally exposed and 11% having been present when a family member
was exposed. Additionally, 57% of the sample reports having witnessed violence during
the conflict, while 15% reported that their home was destroyed due to the conflict, and 43%
reported that their home was damaged. The widespread damage to homes is a symptom of
the indiscriminate nature of many of the attacks during the conflict.
Table 3.2: Summary statistics for variables measuring exposure to violence.
NUnique PercentMissing Mean SD Min Median Max
Exposure to violence 3 10 0.24 0.43 0.00 0.00 1.00
Personally exposed to violence? 3 9 0.19 0.40 0.00 0.00 1.00
Family exposed and personally present? 3 10 0.11 0.32 0.00 0.00 1.00
Witnessed violence? 3 10 0.57 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00
Home destroyed? 3 10 0.15 0.36 0.00 0.00 1.00
Home damaged? 3 9 0.43 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00
To evaluate the theory presented above, I focus on three outcome families. Summary
statistics for all outcome variables by family are shown in the Appendix. The first family
measures integration into an IDP’s local community. The primary measure is Integration
Index, which is the sum of the following five binary variables5: Feel close connection to
5I also combine the five variables using principal components analysis for robustness. These results are
available in the Appendix.
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location measures whether an IDP reports feeling an extremely, very, or moderately close
connection to the community in their current location. Rarely feel like an outsider mea-
sures whether an IDP reports sometimes or never feeling like an outsider in their current
location. Rarely feel isolated measures whether an IDP reports sometimes or never feeling
isolated from society in their current location. Get favors from locals measures whether an
IDP reports receiving favors from local non-IDPs at least once per year. Get help measures
whether an IDP reports having local non-IDPs in their social circle who they could ask for
help if needed. The variables, adapted from the Immigration Policy Lab Integration Index,
capture two dimensions of social integration: the first three variables capture psychological
integration, or how comfortable an IDP feels in their location. The last two capture be-
havioral integration, or how an IDP functions as an integrated member of their community
[126].
The second and third outcome families measure the mechanisms. The second fam-
ily measures psychological trauma. PTSD or CPTSD diagnosis measures whether an
IDP displays symptoms consistent with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder or Complex Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder. To measure this, I employ the International Trauma Question-
naire [154], an 18-question instrument that focuses on the core symptoms of PTSD and
complex PTSD.6 In the sample, 18.9% of respondents receive a PTSD or CPTSD diagno-
sis.
The third outcome family consists of 4 variables measuring the length of expected stay
of IDPs. Can return now? is coded as 1 if a respondent answered “yes” to the question:
“If you wanted to, could you return to the town or city that you resided in before being
6Complex PTSD or CPTSD is a condition where one experiences symptoms consistent with PTSD, along
with additional symptoms.
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displaced now?”. Pre-displacement location safe? measures whether a respondent claims
that their pre-displacement town or city is at least neither safe nor unsafe. Plan to return
soon measures whether a respondent intends to return to their pre-displacement town or
city in the next 12 months. Hope to return at all? measures whether the respondent hopes
to return and live in their pre-displacement city at all.
3.5.3 Empirical strategy
To determine the effect of exposure to violence on the above outcomes, I employ a fixed-
effects strategy, relying on the indiscriminate nature of the shelling for identification. In
this approach, I assume that, within cities, each respondent had the same probability of
experiencing violence such that exposure to violence was random. Here, I introduce the
estimation strategies used to identify a causal effect. Then, I discuss and provide evidence
in favor of the key identification assumption.
I apply 5 primary modeling approaches to identify the treatment effect. The simplest ap-
proach to estimating the effect of exposure to violence, which I label Base FE is to regress
the outcome of interest on the indicator for exposure to violence with pre-displacement
locality fixed effects, which takes the form
Yi = βvi + ηl + εl
where Yi is the outcome for respondent i, vi measures whether the respondent was exposed
to violence, ηl is a vector of pre-displacement locality fixed effects and εl is an error term
clustered at the pre-displacement locality level.
Along with this approach, I estimate a model including unbalanced pre-treatment co-
variates (Unbalanced covariates) and all measured covariates (All covariates). I also esti-
70
Chapter 3. Conflict and social integration among the forcibly
displaced: Theory and evidence from Ukraine
mate a model including displacement-year fixed effects interacted with the pre-displacement
locality fixed effects (X Displaced year FE), such that units are compared within pre-
displacement localities and their year of leaving that locality, accounting for the length
of time that each unit had to integrate into their new community and differences in the
probability of exposure to violence depending on how long they were in the conflict zone.7
Finally, because identifying the effect of household-level harm may be more difficult than
direct personal harm, due to factors like household composition and size, I estimate the
base fixed effects model, measuring the exposure variable as 1 only if the respondent re-
ported personally experiencing harm (Direct harm). Along with these approaches I also
estimate matching models with all covariates and exact matching on binary covariates and
pre-displacement localities, shown in the Appendix.
3.5.3.1 Identification assumption: Violence against civilians was indiscriminate
The key assumption necessary for identification is that IDPs’ integration outcomes are
unrelated to their probability of being exposed to violence. While this assumption cannot
be explicitly proven, I provide evidence consistent with the assumption in two ways: I
first discuss the qualitative evidence in support of violence being considered indiscriminate
within cities. I then provide quantitative evidence in support of this claim by showing
that those exposed and not exposed to violence have similar pre-treatment characteristics,
within their respective pre-displacement locations.
The early periods of the conflict featured heavy weaponry and shellings, causing civil-
ian casualties and injuries, and the destruction of large parts of civilian areas [140]. In-
7Year of displacement can be post-treatment to exposure to violence, so I don’t use employ it as the
primary approach.
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vestigations into civilian casualties have shown that both sides in the conflict have used
unguided rockets in civilian areas in an indiscriminate fashion [155]. Such rockets cannot
be accurately targeted and thus have caused indiscriminate casualties and injuries in civil-
ian areas. These bombs have been used in heavily populated civilian areas, such as near
schools [156]. As a result, since the conflict began at least 3,375 civilians have lost their
lives and more than 7,000 have suffered injuries due to the conflict [157].
The widespread civilian casualties have occurred because the objective of the conflict
on both sides is to acquire and defend territory [158]. Due to this objective, the type
of warfare employed in the Donbas is not specifically targeted. Instead, attacks occur
within cities where combatants take strongholds and their enemies attempt to drive them
out. Many civilian casualties can be attributed to shelling by Ukrainian forces of locations
used by armed separatists as their bases [159]. Armed groups have often deployed in
densely populated civilian areas, and attempts to drive them out lead to collateral damage
[160].
Indiscriminate attacks during the conflict against areas occupied by civilians have been
extensively documented. The conflict has seen the widespread use of rockets such as the
Grad system, which cannot be targeted to specific buildings. Moreover, these rockets often
fired from a distance and location in which the target cannot be directly seen, and so need
to be used in sufficient numbers to destroy a specific target, leading to collateral damage
around the target area [161]. The Grad multiple launch rocket system (MLRS), which has
been used by both sides in the conflict, has “the widest area effect of any conventional
weapon system in use anywhere today”, causing indiscriminate damage to civilians and
their property [162]. Indeed, the rocket is nicknamed “Hail”, as it is “designed to deliver
its munitions over an area rather than a point target” [163]. Along with an inability to
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target, combatants often lack the training needed to minimize collateral damage [164].
Indiscriminate shelling using such weapons has afflicted cities and towns throughout
the East. In one case in the city of Mariupol in 2015, indiscriminate shelling using a Grad
MLRS struck residential areas, leading to the deaths of 30 civilians and damaging apart-
ments, schools, and shops [162]. Despite the Russian command being informed of “resi-
dential areas of Mariupol having been hit by missiles, grossly misdirected fire of certain of
the launchers, and general issues with target coordinates and/or corrections”, they contin-
ued shelling the city [165]. In Sloviansk, “Mortar and heavy artillery fire. . . encroached into
civilian areas and multiple residential buildings (were) hit inside the city as the Ukrainian
forces. . . widened their area of shelling” [166]. In Donetsk and Luhansk, “targeting [was]
so woefully inaccurate that hundreds of civilians [were] killed in the process” [167]. In
attacks on Ilovaisk, which OHCHR considers “emblematic of human rights violations and
abuses. . . that have been repeatedly committed during the conflict,” nearly one-third of indi-
vidual houses were destroyed, and over 116 apartment-type buildings were damaged [168].
The result of this indiscriminate shelling, along with the massive loss of civilian life,
has been the destruction of large amounts of physical property and infrastructure. One
study estimates that over one-third of the hospitals and clinics in Donbas were damaged or
destroyed, likely due to collateral damage [169]. Along with this, more than 50,000 homes
of civilians have been damaged during the conflict [160].
The implication of indiscriminate shelling being widespread during the conflict is that,
although many civilians were directly exposed to violence during the conflict, their ex-
posure was not due to observable characteristics. Instead, those located in the same geo-
graphical areas had similar probabilities of being exposed to violence; whether one home
or another was directly hit by a rocket was a matter of chance.
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3.5.3.2 Balance
To provide further evidence that exposure to violence was indiscriminate within geographic
locations, I show balance on pre-treatment covariates. For each covariate, I regress the
treatment variable on the covariate, along with pre-displacement city fixed effects. The
results are shown in Figure 3.3. The following covariates were measured: Age, pre-
displacement Household size, Pre-displacement income measured monthly, Highly social?
which measures whether a respondent reported having had extended conversations with
an above-average number of unique people each week before being displaced, Male?,
Married?, College degree, which measures whether the respondent had a 2-year degree
or higher, and Distance from town which is measure in meters of the distance of a respon-
dents’ pre-displacement home from the center of their reported city.
The results support the interpretation that violence was indiscriminate. Three covariates
were unbalanced: Pre-displacement income, Male? and College degree?. While males and
more educated IDPs were slightly more likely to report being directly exposed to violence,
those with higher pre-displacement income were less likely to be exposed. The effect sizes
are small; for example, men were only 5% more likely to report being targeted. However,
more important for the identification strategy are the variables that are unrelated to expo-
sure to violence; first, distance to town does not predict exposure, suggesting that specific
geographic locations were not systematically targeted. Second, pre-displacement sociality
is unrelated to exposure, meaning that there was no observable pre-treatment relationship
between one’s propensity for forming social ties and exposure to violence. Moreover, I
show below that results are robust to conditioning on the unbalanced covariates in the re-
gressions.
74
Chapter 3. Conflict and social integration among the forcibly






Pre−displacement income (10,000 UAH)
Household size
Age
−0.2 −0.1 0.0 0.1






Figure 3.3: Balance between those exposed to violence and those not exposed, with pre-
displacement city fixed effects. Significant covariates are shown in red. Three covariates
predict exposure to violence: pre-displacement income, gender and education.
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3.6 Results and discussion
This section displays and discusses the primary results and then examines the evidence for
the mechanisms. I display the results for the 5 models in the form of coefficient plots.
Tabular results are available in the Appendix. Figure 3.4 displays the results for the out-
comes related to local integration. The outcomes are stable across the different models.
Those exposed to violence have on average 0.24-0.54 points less on the integration index
(mean=2.86). This difference is driven by 3 of the 5 outcomes: those exposed to violence
are more likely to feel like an outsider in their current location (10% − 24% decrease de-
pending on the model), more likely to feel isolated (9%− 17% decrease depending on the
model), and less likely to be able to get help from local non-IDPs (5% − 6% decrease de-
pending on the model). However, there is no effect on their feelings of closeness to the
local community or their reported number of favors received in the last 12 months. In the
Appendix, I show that these results are robust to a matching approach and to measuring the
integration index through principal components analysis. Altogether, the results indicate
that those exposed to violence have a more difficult time integrating.
3.6.1 Sensitivity
I next turn to formally evaluating the sensitivity of the main results to unobserved con-
founders. I follow Cinelli and Hazlett [170] to determine how strong confounding from
unobserved factors would need to be to alter the results of the analysis. I focus on the
integration index as the outcome of interest in this section.
Table ?? shows the results of the test of sensitivity. The robustness value shows that
unobserved confounders would need to explain more than 17.3% of the residual variance
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Figure 3.4: The effect of exposure to violence on integration. IDPs exposed to violence
integrate less into their new communities along several measures.
77
Chapter 3. Conflict and social integration among the forcibly
displaced: Theory and evidence from Ukraine
of both the treatment and the outcome for the point estimate to become 0. For the out-
come to lose statistical significance at the 0.05 level, confounders would need to explain
8.4% of the residual variance of both the treatment and the outcome. To understand these
numbers, consider the covariate Gender, which is an observable factor on which violence
can be targeted, and which has been shown to predict exposure to violence in other contexts
[@hazlett2020angry]. Here, gender explained 2.1% of the residual variance of the outcome
and 0.2% of the residual variance of exposure to violence. For unobserved confounding to
explain the results found here, they would need to be substantially stronger than a covariate
for which targeted violence can occur.
Outcome: Integration Index
Treatment: Est. S.E. t-value R2Y∼D|X RVq=1 RVq=1,α=0.05
D -0.495 0.136 -3.638 3.5% 17.3% 8.4%
df = 365 Bound (1x Gender): R2Y∼Z|X,D = 2.1%, R
2
D∼Z|X = 0.2%
Table 3.3: Results of the formal sensitivity test. Unobserved confounders would need to be
strong in order to cause the point estimate to become 0: they would need to explain more
than 17.3% of the residual variance of both the treatment and the outcome.
3.6.2 Mechanisms
After establishing the robustness of the main results, I now turn towards evaluating the
mechanisms. In the theory section, I argued that the total effect of exposure to violence
was ambiguous, as it could both increase the costs of exerting effort to integrate, but also
increase the payoff of successful integration due to extended time frames. While I found
that the total effect on integration was negative, it remains to be determined if there is
evidence for these mechanisms.
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Figure 3.5: The effect of exposure to violence on expected length of stay. While IDPs
exposed to violence are less likely to see their pre-displacement location as safe, they are
no less likely to plan to return soon or at all.
I first evaluate the effect of exposure to violence on the outcomes associated with the
expected length of stay of IDPs. These results are shown in Figure 3.5. As expected, those
exposed to violence are less likely to state that their pre-displacement location is safe and
slightly less likely to believe that they could return to their homes now, although this result
is not significant. Moreover, the effects are strongest among those who suffered personal
harm. However, this fear of return does not translate to a difference in expected length of
stay: IDPs exposed to violence are no less likely to state that they plan to return soon, or
that they hope to return in the future.
Second, I evaluate the effect of exposure to violence on PTSD and CPTSD prevalence.
79
Chapter 3. Conflict and social integration among the forcibly
displaced: Theory and evidence from Ukraine
PTSD or CPTSD diagnosis
0.0 0.1 0.2












Figure 3.6: The effect of exposure to violence on PTSD and CPTSD. IDPs exposed to
violence are more likely to have symptoms associated with PTSD and CPTSD as expected.
These results are shown in Figure 3.6. As expected, exposure to violence increases the
probability of a PTSD or CPTSD diagnosis, across all models. The results are also large
substantively: the mean rate of PTSD or CPTSD in the sample was 18.7%, and the point
estimates across models are larger than 7.5%.
To further understand the relationship between exposure to violence, PTSD, and in-
tegration, I employ causal mediation analysis. I focus on the Average Causal Mediation
Effect (ACME), which is the average change in the outcome corresponding to a change in
the mediator from 0 to 1, holding the treatment status constant [171]. It represents the effect
of the treatment on the outcome, through the mediator. I conduct the mediation analysis
using the same fixed effects strategy and conditioning on pre-treatment covariates that may
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affect the propensity to develop PTSD: age, gender, and education.
The results are shown in Figure 3.7 and provide evidence for the theorized relationship.
The ACME is statistically different from 0 (p = 0.074), which suggests that exposure to
violence increases the probability of developing PTSD, which in turn decreases an IDP’s
score on the integration index, as theorized. PTSD moderates about 13% of the total effect
of exposure to violence on the integration index.
3.7 Discussion
Understanding how exposure to violence affects the ability of the forcibly displaced to
successfully integrate into new communities is crucial to tailor policies and aid programs
towards promoting migrant success. From a state-building perspective, understanding the
effects of exposure to violence at the micro-level allow insight into the factors that can in-
hibit or promote social cohesion after conflict. The results of this study strongly indicate
that, for the internally displaced in Ukraine, exposure to violence during the displacement
process negatively impacts the ability to integrate into new communities. Violence-affected
IDPs are more likely to feel like outsiders in their community, to feel isolated, and to be-
lieve that they could not receive help from locals if needed. However, there were no effects
on feelings of closeness to the local community and the number of favors received from
locals in the past year. While this might indicate that IDPs exposed to violence feel less
integrated relative to others, but actually interact with locals at similar levels, it is also
consistent with violence-affected IDPs needing greater aid, possibly due to their lack of
integration. In favor of this interpretation, Figure 3.8 shows that, while violence-affected
IDPs are employed at a similar rate to non-affected IDPs, they are less likely to have ob-
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Figure 3.7: Causal mediation analysis for exposure to violence, PTSD, and the integration
index. The ACME is statistically different from 0, suggesting the theorized relationship
between the 3 variables may be correct. The ADE is the effect of exposure to violence not
working through PTSD, and the total effect is the sum of the ACME and the ADE.
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Figure 3.8: The effect of exposure to violence on employment outcomes with pre-
displacement locality fixed effects. Those exposed to violence are less likely to have stable
employment and less likely to have jobs that match their skill sets.
tained stable employment since being displaced, and work in jobs that match their skills
sets less.8
Examining the mechanisms, I find that the evidence supports the interpretation that ex-
posure to violence increases the probability of having PTSD or CPTSD, indicating that
violence-affected IDPs may have trouble integrating because, for them, the costs of in-
tegration are higher. Conversely, I do not find strong evidence that exposure to violence
increases the expected length of stay for IDPs. While it does increase their belief that their
prior location was unsafe, I do not find that it makes them less likely to return in the near
8Regression using the base fixed-effects approach.
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or short term. However, it is important to note that only 10% of the sample responded that
they planned to return in the next 12 months, indicating that most IDPs believe they will
remain away from their homes for an extended period. In locations where return is more
likely, it may be that the violence-affected intend to stay longer.
The robustness of these results to different modeling approaches and measurement
strategies, along with the analysis of the main result’s sensitivity indicates that for IDPs
in Ukraine, exposure to violence decreases their ability to integrate. However, the ability to
generalize these findings depends on several factors. First, in Ukraine IDPs did not resettle
in camps and instead integrated directly into pre-existing communities. This integration
process may be distinct from those in camp settings, in which many IDPs and refugees
find themselves. However, research on exposure to violence and integration among IDPs
in camp settings has found similar results in other locations [172]. Second, the displaced in
Ukraine did not, largely, have to adapt to new cultures or learn new languages to effectively
integrate, which is not true of all settings. However, such settings would imply higher func-
tional requirements for integration, potentially increasing the gap between those exposed
and not exposed to violence. Third, in this setting a large number of IDPs expressed that
they did not hope to return to their location of origin, making local integration more likely.
In other settings, especially in cases of cross-border forced migration, desires to return may
be higher, lowering the baseline likelihood of local integration. This would affect the find-
ings if, in such settings, those exposed to violence preferred to remain more often. These
limitations to generalizability speak to the need to conduct similar research in a greater
variety of settings.
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3.8 Conclusion
Conflict has enormous consequences for civilians caught in its midst. It can destroy homes,
assets, and take the lives of relatives and close friends. Moreover, its impact stretches far be-
yond its immediate consequences: the experiences encountered by civilians during wartime
affect their ability to rebuild their lives even after they leave conflict-affected areas. This re-
search shows that, while exposure to violence may theoretically make civilians more or less
likely to be able to integrate into new communities, violence-exposed internally displaced
people in Ukraine struggle to form strong ties to their new communities, in comparison to
those not directly affected by violence. Moreover, this finding is robust to a multitude of
modeling strategies and can survive a large amount of unobserved confounding. I show that
the difficulty in integrating is consistent with a psychological mechanism: those exposed
to violence are more likely to suffer from PTSD, and PTSD, in turn, decreases their ability
to integrate.
The findings have important consequences for policymakers and aid organizations in-
terested in promoting the integration of the displaced. While sweeping changes to laws re-
garding naturalization and citizenship can have effects on integration [e.g. 6], less is known
about how demand for integration varies within migrant groups. This research shows that
some displaced people can lag behind others in their ability to integrate, holding state-
level institutional characteristics constant. This indicates that integration could further be
boosted by focusing on those left behind. Moreover, the research indicates that a focus on
mental health services could be effective in addressing this gap.
However, further research is needed to understand the full scope of variation in de-
mand for integration among the displaced. While exposure to violence has large effects on
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integration outcomes, other factors can affect the refugee’s time frames and costs of inte-
gration, such as employment opportunities and pre-existing social networks in non-conflict
areas. Future studies could evaluate many of the predictors of integration. Moreover, as
noted above, this study focused on internally displaced people, living outside of camp-
like environments. The effects of violence could differ based on whether displacement
is cross-border and whether the displaced live among other displaced people, or in pre-
existing communities. Future research could incorporate variation among these factors to
test whether this effect travels across contexts.
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A theory of targeted and indiscriminate state violence in
networks
4.1 Introduction
The use of indiscriminate violence by states is surprising because it can cause mobilization
in favor of insurgents, but states employ it anyway [173, 174, 24, e.g.]. Figure 4.1 shows
that states continuously use violence against civilians, and that a large proportion of this
violence is indirect in the form of air strikes, shelling and chemical weapons. The use
of indiscriminate violence varies by time and location, provoking the question of under
what conditions states prefer this strategy. Existing arguments focus on the state’s capacity
to effectively use violence, the role of limited information [24], or the inability of a rebel
group to protect civilians [25] but predict that indiscriminate violence should be used rarely
or only when conflicts end quickly, and generally view indiscriminate violence as a second-
best option for the state. I offer a theory suggesting that indiscriminate violence can be
the state’s preferred strategy even when it can engage in targeted violence, conditional on
visible characteristics of the structure of civilians’ social networks.
I study a formal social network model of violence and displacement in order to under-
stand the choice of the state to use targeted or indiscriminate violence against a community
of civilians in order to remove them from a territory. I focus on the effects of network struc-
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Figure 4.1: The first figure shows the proportion of violent events per year committed
against civilians in 6 countries. The second shows the proportion of these events that use
only indirect force, such as air strikes, shelling and chemical weapons. Indirect violence
against civilians is used often and repeatedly over long time horizons. Data is from Donnay,
Dunford, McGrath, Backer, and Cunningham [175] via Zhukov, Davenport, and Kostyuk
[176]. Countries were chosen to show that indiscriminate violence is used against civilians
in a wide variety of settings. 88
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ture because social networks play an important role in determining the effects of repression
and violence strategies on behavior [177]. Violence necessarily has impacts beyond its di-
rect victims because it reshapes social structures through the removal of network members.
I analyze the effects of the change in network structure in response to violence directly and
examine how they determine the strategic behavior of the state.
The theory captures a setting in which a state has chosen a particular village or city to
forcibly remove the population from and can either strike the village in an indiscriminate
fashion or remove particular members within it.1 This territory contains a social network
of civilians, which determines how civilians respond to the violence. Civilians weigh their
own incentives to leave the territory against the value of their ties in the network. By using
violence, the state can manipulate these ties. The state’s choice is a gamble: it can target a
certain influential member of the community and hope that other network members respond
to this removal, or remove network members at random and potentially cause influential
civilians and other civilians to leave in response. To directly compare the two strategies, I
consider the case when both eliminate one node in expectation.
I show that characteristics of civilian social networks shape the optimal strategy for the
state. The state’s choice is determined by both network structure and the distribution of
individual attributes of civilians in the network. The results of the model demonstrate that
indiscriminate violence can be preferred to targeted violence based on characteristics at
two levels: at the network level, as the distribution of degree among nodes becomes more
uniform, indiscriminate violence becomes more valuable. At the individual level, as value
1In this setup, I do not explicitly model the decision of the state to use or not use violence. I focus on
situations on cases where the state has already decided to use violence and must pick a strategy for using it.
For a review of the literature on the choice of states to use violence against civilians, see Valentino, 2014.
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for others in the network and motivation to leave the network are more positively corre-
lated throughout the community (for example, when the civilians with the greatest network
ties also have the largest benefits from leaving), the unraveling effect of indiscriminate
violence is greater. Therefore, I argue that, along with Kalyvas [24]’s list of conditions
favoring indiscriminate violence (imbalances of power, low resources or low information),
under certain conditions and holding all else equal, social network characteristics make
indiscriminate violence a strategic choice.
Substantively, the analysis indicates that strategies of violence can have heterogeneous
effects depending on the composition of the community experiencing violence. This differs
from past theories which view the state’s choice of violence as a function of the state’s
levels of information and technology. I show that characteristics of those receiving violence
dictate the optimal strategy as well. At the group level, more uniform networks will provoke
more indiscriminate violence. Within groups, leaders that are more mobile or have greater
ties to insurgency and thus greater motivation to leave for other opportunities or to mobilize
are more likely to provoke indiscriminate violence. At the state level, the theory indicates
that the state’s optimal strategy can vary within time periods and across locations.
I then extend the model in two ways. First, I incorporate potential mobilization against
the state as a result of driving away nodes from the network. The effect that this extension
has on the model results depends on the distribution of motivation to leave the network,
but in general makes indiscriminate violence more attractive. Second, I extend the result
on degree distribution to larger networks and show through simulations that a similar result
holds in a more abstract network environment.
The study builds upon Siegel [177], in which simulations are used to demonstrate how
mobilization responds to targeted or random removal of nodes from a network. I study a
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similar network setup, but employ simpler network structures in order to obtain an analyt-
ical solution. I also focus on understanding the state’s strategic choice between targeted
and indiscriminate violence, whereas Siegel [177] focuses on the collective response of the
victims.
Outside of the literature on violence repression, this essay makes contributions to the
general study of social networks in political science. I consider networks in which edges
dissuade instead of motivate, bridging a gap between literature in psychology and sociology
on affectual ties and formal network analysis [178, 179, 180]. By directly considering the
spillover effects of node removal (the effects of a node being removed on the behavior of
other nodes) and asymmetries of influence in networks, the analysis is also related to work
on collective behavior, thresholds and optimal seeding [181, 36, 182, 183, 184, e.g.].
Next, I introduce the theory and the findings in more depth before formalizing it. I
then introduce the extensions, analyzing the effect that incorporating mobilization for rebel
groups in the the state’s expected utility has for the findings. Then, I extend the results
on degree distribution to n-node networks and use simulations to establish a more general
result. Following, I offer a translation of the formal findings that is of use to empirical
researchers interested in studying the relationship between strategies of violence and social
network structure. Following this, I briefly conclude.
4.2 An overview of the theory
In the model a state seeks to remove civilians from a network through violence. This as-
sumption of this goal of violence follows from the empirical finding that states use violence
against civilians in order to manipulate their locations and social structures [185, 186, 187,
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51]. Displacement is used as a tool by armed groups to take control of territory [188]. In
the model, removing civilians from a network can be seen as either forcing them to leave
the geographic area where the network is located, or causing them to change their behavior
by no longer engaging in some activity that is damaging to the state.2 Such a strategy may
be likely when a territory is valuable economically or strategically, or due to the dynamics
of the conflict [187]. Regardless, the high level of forced migration in civil wars provides
an empirical basis for this assumption.
The network in the model is a representation of civilians (also called network members,
agents, or nodes) in a territory that is valuable to the state during conflict. Before violence
occurs all members of the network are in this territory and can be targeted by the state. The
state first chooses a strategy of violence, either targeted or indiscriminate, which eliminates
nodes in the network. If the state chooses targeted violence it pays a generic cost. This cost
can be thought of as an ex ante cost the state must pay in order to use the strategy, such as
gathering information on the network.3
After the choice of strategy civilians who are not eliminated can remain in or leave the
territory. Network edges between civilians serve to keep nodes grounded in a place, and
2A different interpretation of the model could be a state choosing to incentivize certain members of a
network in order to degrade the network. However, while this may be possible in some situations, such as
those where the civilians do not associate with the rebel group, it is unlikely is situations where the rebel
group represents a certain identity, although ethnic defection remains possible [189, 190].
3It is possible that indiscriminate violence could be more costly to the state in situations where it provokes
condemnation or costlier actions by international actors. For this to affect the results of the model, it would
be necessary for indiscriminate violence against civilians to provoke greater response from the international
community than targeted violence against civilians. I do not incorporate possible differential responses of the
international community based on the strategy of violence chosen into this model, but do note that as the costs
of indiscriminate violence approach the costs of targeted violence it is less likely to be the strategic choice of
the state.
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breaking edges by removing civilians makes flight, or leaving the network, more likely.
When making the choice to leave, network members weigh the net benefit to leaving against
the value of their ties in the network. The goal of the state is to choose the strategy that
has the greatest impact on the network by removing the greatest number of civilians in
expectation, either through killing them or removing network members that keep them
grounded in place and causing them to leave the network. Leaving the network is any
action that leads civilians to no longer inhibit the state’s plans in the territory, such as
fleeing, joining a group in another location, joining a group to fight back against the state
or submitting to the state’s cause.
I model the choice of a network member to stay or leave as a comparison between the
value that other network members have for the civilian, and one’s motivation to leave the
network. Network ties can only affect a civilian’s choice through their value. In general,
this captures the value that the social network has for an individual, in terms of affectual
ties [180]. In other words, people who form ties often like being around each other, and
leaving a network and these ties can be costly.
Motivation to leave the network can capture several incentives: civilians may consider
joining a rebel group, which would require them to leave the territory. They also may
have incentives to move through social contacts outside of the territory or labor market
opportunities. The generic net benefit here can capture any force that may lead a civilian
to move from their home or change their behavior toward actions less damaging to the
state. In this model, both of these parameters are taken as exogenous and the only piece
that varies in response to violence is network structure through the elimination of nodes.
Because the purpose of this model is to generate predictions on the strategies of violence
used by states, I do not consider more complex civilian strategies. Instead, the stochastic
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actions of civilians reflect reasonable levels of information for the state about what civilians
may do in response to violence.
I restrict the state’s ability to target civilians by assuming that it can only target the
network member with the highest level of value for other civilians in the network. I make
this restriction because it assumes a reasonable level of information for the state: it can
observe some characteristics of individuals in the community that proxy for value, such as
status or profession, but cannot observe individual-level preferences. Moreover, it is easier
for the state to identify high status members of communities like community or religious
leaders, whereas less influential members are less identifiable.
In this setting, I provide two key results: first, as the distribution of ties in a network
changes, so does the optimal strategy for the state. Targeted violence is more efficient
when the targeted node has higher degree than other nodes in the network. This is due to
heightened ability of central nodes to cause spillovers when they are eliminated: when the
targeted node has high degree, removing it removes the largest possible number of edges
from the network. Moreover, it is harder to cause this node to leave the network in response
to the probabilistic removal of any other node. Because indiscriminate violence eliminates
this node with a probability less than one, it becomes less valuable relative to targeted
violence, even when costly.
Second, I show that as value in the network and motivation to leave the network are
negatively correlated, targeted violence becomes more valuable relative to indiscriminate
violence (and vice versa). The logic of this result comes from the potential spillovers
that can occur from the elimination of a certain agent. When value and motivation are
negatively correlated targeted violence is more effective because eliminating an influential
but unmotivated agent removes it from the network when it otherwise wouldn’t leave while
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also leading the motivated agents to leave the network. In this case, the state will be willing
to pay the costs of targeting because the expected spillovers from targeting an influential
node are much larger than those of eliminating an agent that is already motivated to leave
and doesn’t greatly impact the behavior of other network members.
Conversely, when an agent is highly motivated to leave a network and also is valu-
able for others in the network, that agent will be eliminated under costly targeted violence.
However, that agent is also likely to leave the network in response to the elimination of any
other node because of its high level of motivation. Thus, the state can employ indiscrim-
inate violence, not pay a cost, and still have this node leave the network in expectation.
On the other hand, when a network member is both not influential and not motivated to
leave it is unlikely to leave in response to the targeting of the most influential node. How-
ever, because it has a chance to be eliminated directly under indiscriminate violence the
probability of it leaving the network is higher if the state chooses this strategy. Thus, indis-
criminate violence has greater potential for spillover effects as the correlation between the
two attributes increases.
This demonstrates that, while targeted violence is more effective for the state under a
variety of conditions, in some cases indiscriminate violence can generate the same level of
destruction as targeted violence without needing to pay the cost of gathering information
for targeting. This suggests that in situations where the state knows that the leader has ties
outside of the village that it can easily access or is highly connected to a rebel group that
could offer shelter, indiscriminate violence can be as effective as targeted violence. Later, I
discuss other possible operationalizations of the abstract variables considered in the theory.
In general, these results demonstrate the value of considering the effects of violence in
a network setting: The effect of the elimination of an agent on the network as a whole is
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a function of that agent’s attributes, in terms of its value to another agent in the network,
and the attributes of other agents, in terms of their willingness to leave the network. When
eliminating one agent causes more agents to leave the network relative to the elimination
of a different agent, targeting this agent is more valuable to the state. Conversely, when
the elimination of agents have similar expected impacts on the network after violence,
randomly eliminating agents can be as or more effective.
In the baseline model, I do not explicitly consider the role of rebel groups in this inter-
action. This is not because the actions of rebel groups are not important, but because the
model takes the incentives of the state to clear the network of civilians as a given, treating
the interaction between the state and the rebel group as exogenous. This allows focus on
the interaction between states and the structure of civilian social networks. However, this
is not to say that the theory does not speak to situations in which the strategy of the state is
affected by rebel groups: there are clear cases where state violence is used indiscriminately
against civilians in order to defeat rebel groups [191]. However, there are also cases of
states engaging in clearance operations against civilians to acquire resources or to establish
greater legitimacy in the territory [187, 192]. The state may have incentives to clear civil-
ians from territories for a multitude of reasons. The theory offered here helps to understand
the type of violence employed in these situations. However, rebel groups do have influence
on patterns of state violence (see, for example, Valentino [51], Azam and Hoeffler [193],
and Schutte [194]), so I consider an extension in which nodes that leave the network can
mobilize in favor of the rebel group. How this addition changes the strategy of the state
depends on the distribution of motivation to leave the network for the nodes in the network,
but in general, as mobilization becomes more damaging to the state, the relative value of
indiscriminate violence increases.
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I proceed by distinguishing between targeted and indiscriminate violence in simple
networks. I consider variations of a 3-agent network, determining the optimal strategy of
violence by the state.4 I then incorporate rebel groups and then extend the model into an
n-node setting.
4.3 Comparing indiscriminate and targeted violence in net-
works
4.3.1 Setup
I consider a simple network model of a state’s choice between targeted and indiscriminate
violence. In the model, the state is confronted with a 3-node network. The goal of the state
is to remove as many nodes as possible from the network.5 The state can choose between
targeted violence, in which a single node is eliminated with certainty, and pay cost κ > 0,
or indiscriminate violence, where in expectation one node is eliminated, and all nodes can
be eliminated with equal probability.6 This operationalization of indiscriminate violence
4I focus on 3-agent networks for two reasons. First, in a 3 node setting, the comparison of the effects
of targeted and indiscriminate violence is tractable and illustrative. Second, as noted by Patty and Penn
[195], changes in the structure of small networks have greater effects than in large networks, meaning the
comparisons between network structures in this essay examines the same mechanisms that operate in a larger
network, and so is informative about the behavior of states in a larger network.
5This is not the goal of the state in all cases where it uses violence against civilians. However, forced
depopulation is a common strategy of states [187]. In general, the theory considers the case where all else
equal, the state would prefer that its choice of violence have the largest effect on this network, irrespective
of the externalities of the violence, including increasing rebel group mobilization. An extension below takes
these externalities into account.
6I only consider cases where indiscriminate violence has a uniform probability of eliminating agents. This
captures settings where territories are cleared or shelled, and is the simplest case of indiscriminate violence.
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captures the ex ante decision the state faces, instead of an ex post realization of which node
was removed. This is closer to a realistic depiction of the trade-off that the state faces. For
every node that leaves the network the state gains utility normalized to 1.
Formally, the network is represented with a set of 3 individuals, {a, b, c} with a 3 × 3
adjacency matrix g where, for generic nodes i and j, gij = 1 is a edge between i 6= j in the
network. I assume that all edges are undirected, meaning gij = 1 =⇒ gji = 1. Edges
are weighted by αij > 0 which is the value to i of maintaining its tie to j. Intuitively, this
represents how valuable it is for i to have j in its network, in terms of the affection i has for
j or the economic value that j provides for i. Ii is defined to be the value of ties to other
actors in the network for i, such that Ii =
g∑
i 6=j
αij . αij need not equal αji. Civilians decide
to leave the network by comparing the cost or benefit from leaving, θi7, to the strength of
ties in the network, Ii. Θi is drawn from a uniform distribution with support [−1, σi]. An
increase in σi increases both the mean and variance of the motivation level for i. Thus, a
civilian remains in the network if Ii ≥ θi. In this interaction, the state is fully informed
about the network structure and the value of ties between nodes, α but only knows the
distribution of the individual level costs or benefits to leaving, Θ.
For simplicity, I restrict the basis on which the state can choose the node it eliminates
when using targeted violence. Formally, define Ti as the total value of node i to all other
nodes in the network, where Ti =
g∑
i 6=j
αji I assume the state targets the node with the
highest total value in the network. In other words, this is the node that has the highest sum
of weighted ties in the network.
7This can be any benefit or cost to leaving the network outside of social factors, such as motivation to
mobilize, ties outside of the network, financial incentives to leave or the financial cost of leaving, the cost of
integrating into a new community and other factors.
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I consider 3-node networks, and assume without loss of generality that nodes can be
ordered as Ta ≥ Tb ≥ Tc. This limits the cases of networks to those where a is always
connected. I vary the number of edges in the networks, analyzing the effects of violence
on networks with 3, 2, and 1 edges. So that networks are equal except for their structure,
the following constraints must be imposed: σc ≤ 0, so that c remains in the network when
the network only has an edge between a and b, σb ≤ αba so that b remains in the network
when its only edge is with a, and σa ≤ αab for the same reason. I proceed by outlining the
conditions under which the state would prefer targeting a single node to eliminating one
node in expectation in these networks settings. I generate results in terms of the constraint
on the cost of targeted violence, κ, for the state to prefer targeted violence. I show the
relationship between network structure and constraints on this cost in Table 4.1 and describe
the results below. The full derivation of these results are available in the Formal Derivation
of Results section.
4.3.2 Analysis
4.3.2.1 Fully connected network
In a fully connected network, all nodes have edges to each other and the elimination of any
node can affect whether the other nodes remain. The structure of this network is shown in
the first panel of Table 4.1. Using targeted violence the state eliminates node a and pays
cost κ. b leaves the network if the edge between a and b is essential for b, or θb > αbc,
which occurs with probability 1− 1+αbc
1+σb
. So the payoff to targeted violence in this case is:
1 + (1− 1 + αbc
1 + σb
)− κ
Under indiscriminate violence, the state eliminates one agent in expectation, such that
99















































































































































































































































Chapter 4. A theory of targeted and indiscriminate state violence
in networks
each agent has a 1
3
probability of being eliminated. Note that these probabilities are inde-
pendent: more than one agent can be eliminated under indiscriminate violence. However,
it is also possible that the state fails to eliminate a single agent. The tension between the
two strategies comes from the fact that with some probability indiscriminate violence can
eliminate more nodes than targeted violence, but also may not eliminate any nodes or nodes
that have a comparatively smaller effect on others’ behavior. In this network, eliminating a
has the potential to cause b to leave the network, and vice versa. Moreover, indiscriminate
violence has some probability of eliminating c, whereas targeted violence does not. The
full presentation of these results is shown in Section C.1.1. The payoff to indiscriminate
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) + (1− 1
1 + σa
))
4.3.2.2 Network with 2 edges
When the edge between b and c is removed, both strategies become more efficient for
the state. These results are shown in Section C.1.2. Under targeted violence, the state
eliminates a and b leaves the network if θb > 0, which is a lower constraint than in the
network with three edges, as c no longer has value for b. The payoff to targeted violence is
1 + (1− 1
1 + σb
)− κ
which is strictly higher than the payoff in the full network.
Indiscriminate violence becomes more efficent as well relative to the three edge net-



















Chapter 4. A theory of targeted and indiscriminate state violence
in networks
However, compared to targeted violence, indiscriminate violence is a worse strategy than
in the three edge network because the edge between c and a still influences a in the case
where b is eliminated by chance and so the relative payoff to targeted violence is higher.
4.3.2.3 Network with 1 edge
Finally, when the edge between a and c is removed, the payoff to targeted violence does not
change. However, indiscriminate violence becomes more efficient because the elimination
of b is more likely to cause a to leave the network, as c no longer has value for a. This is













Overall, this analysis has a fundamental and simple finding: if targeted violence is more
costly than indiscriminate violence, there are conditions under which indiscriminate vio-
lence is a best response to the structure of the network and the relationship between value
in a network and motivation. How low this cost needs to be for targeted violence to be
preferred is dictated by several factors.
First, indiscriminate violence becomes more efficient as value in the network, Ti and
motivation to leave the network, Θi are more positively correlated. In other words, when
the most influential agents are also the most highly motivated to leave the network, the
state more often prefers to employ indiscriminate violence. This statement follows from
the fact that right hand sides of the constraints on κ are decreasing in σa. This means
there is a stricter constraint on the costs of targeted violence when a is motivated: the
cost of targeted violence must be lower. The intuition for this result is straightforward:
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as a becomes more motivated, she is more likely to leave the network in response to the
elimination of any agent. Thus, the state can remove a from the network without paying
a cost by using indiscriminate violence. Conversely, when σb is large, targeted violence is
more efficient because b is more likely to leave when a is targeted.
Second, the distribution of degree in the network affects whether indiscriminate or tar-
geted violence is the preferred strategy. Targeted violence has its highest value relative to
indiscriminate violence when the node with the highest value has higher degree than other
nodes. Specifically, the difference in expected payoffs between targeted and indiscriminate
violence is highest in the 2 edge network, and second highest in the 1 edge network except
when αac is much larger than αbc or σa is much smaller than σb, representing the case when
a stays in the network if b is eliminated, which makes targeted violence more valuable. The
intuition for this result is as follows: when each node has the same degree, the removal
of any node has the potential to influence whether or not another node leaves the network
directly, and all nodes have value for each other, making it more likely for each node to
stay in the network. However, when the node with the highest level of value has more
edges than other nodes, then its elimination has a greater potential to directly cause other
nodes to leave. Moreover, when this node has higher degree, it is harder to make it leave
the network in response to the elimination of other nodes because they have value for the
node. Consider the network with 2 edges. In this network, if a is eliminated, b leaves the
network if its level of motivation is positive. However, if under indiscriminate violence c is
eliminated, b’s behavior is only influenced if a’s motivation to leave is larger than the value
of the edge between a and b which is never true by assumption. Because a has shorter
paths to other nodes in the network, the conditions for targeted violence to have spillover
effects are less stringent than those for indiscriminate violence in such a setting. However,
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in the network with 3 edges this is not the case. In this network, eliminating a only causes
b to leave if its motivation to leave is larger than the value of the edge between b and c,
and so the bar is higher for targeted violence to have spillover effects. Because of this, the
payoff to targeted violence is always weakly largest in the two edge network. I explore
the relationship between the distribution of degree in a network and the optimal strategy of
violence further in Section 4.3.5.
4.3.4 The role of rebel groups
A key assumption in the above setting is that a node being eliminated is just as valuable as
a node choosing to leave the network. This assumption may be tenable in settings where a
state seeks to access a valuable territory and is not concerned about the downstream effects
of villagers being forced away from their land. It is also applicable in situations where
villagers can aid rebels by funneling them key resources only accessible in their place
of residence. In these cases, the state benefits from driving villagers away. However, in
conflicts where a rebel group poses a credible threat to the state, forcing villagers away
rather than directly eliminating them may be more costly, as these victims of violence may
begin to aid rebel forces, either by joining them directly or providing them information.
This suggests that driving villagers away in some cases may be costly to the state. I consider
the effect of that assumption here. I show that the results of the baseline model hold when
incorporating rebel groups into the analysis.
Specifically, I adapt the above model to incorporate a cost to driving a node away from
a network rather than directly eliminating them. I assume that a node that is driven away
from the network chooses to conspire with a rebel group against the state in the larger
conflict. To model this, I amend the payoff that the state receives from driving away a node
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to be 1 − 1
P
, where P > 1 is the population of possible rebel group members and this
term represents the marginal impact of a node joining the rebel group. The assumption is
that every node that is not eliminated but leaves the network increases the chance that the
state loses the conflict. As P becomes smaller, causing a node to leave the network is less
valuable for the state and makes directly eliminating nodes more valuable. I determine the
moderating effect of this externality on the state’s preferred strategy.
I show the constraints on κ necessary for targeted violence to be preferred in the ap-
pendix. The effect of incorporating anti-state mobilization into the model depends on the
distributions of Θa and Θb. As P decreases, meaning the marginal impact of a node join-
ing the rebel group is greater, targeting becomes more effective when σa is large. This is
because a leaving the network due to b being eliminated becomes less valuable, and this
can only take place under indiscriminate violence. Conversely, when σb increases and αbc
decreases, a decrease in P makes indiscriminate violence more valuable, as b is more likely
to leave in response to targeted violence, but the value of it leaving the network is less.
In general, increasing the effect of mobilization in the form of decreasing P increases
the relative value of indiscriminate violence more often than it increases the relative value
of targeted violence. For a decrease in P to increase the value of targeted violence in the
fully connected network, it must be that
σa >
23αbc − 4αac − 21σb − 4αacσb






Consider the case where αac = 0.6, αbc = 0.5, and σb = 1. Then σa must be greater than
5.72 for a decrease in P to increase the value of targeted violence. This can be understood
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in relation to the findings in the initial model setup: what made targeting valuable for the
state was the ability to selectively eliminate the node that would have the greatest spillover
effects on the rest of the network. However, when these spillovers become less valuable
to the state’s goals, indiscriminate violence becomes relatively more effective because it
causes spillovers less often. Thus, it is more likely that states will resort to indiscriminate
violence against civilians when the backlash among connected nodes is damaging to the
state.
4.3.5 n-node networks
Thus far, the analysis has focused on small networks with the same number of nodes and
variation in the number of edges. However, as networks become larger they can take on
a variety of forms, and two networks with the same level of mean density can have dif-
ferent effects on the behavior of nodes. Here, I focus on establishing a result for n-node
networks. I concentrate on networks characterized by connected components of essential
edges, where the removal of an node within a component leads the entire component to exit
the network.8 I hold the number of nodes and components constant but allow for variation
in the number of nodes within components.
Connecting this variation to real world networks, a network with a particularly large
component would represent a tight-knit, homogeneous setting where most network mem-
bers are acquainted and sensitive to each other’s behavior. For example, small villages with
large kinship networks would likely display a large component of essential ties. However,
when considering essential ties, many networks may be splintered into several small com-
ponents. For example, networks in larger villages and cities, or networks in which nodes
8A connected component is a maximal set of nodes where every node is connected by a path.
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have heterogeneous characteristics are likely to have many components.
Specifically, I consider fragile networks with n nodes, and j components, where all
edges in the network are essential, and all nodes in each component are connected, such
that the elimination of an edge removes an entire component. I focus on variation in the
distribution of nodes in components. I assume that targeted violence eliminates the node
with the largest degree, which by assumption is any node in the largest component. Let the
size of component i be ci and denote the largest component as cb. Then, the payoff to the
state of targeted violence is cb − k, where k is once again the cost of targeting.
Again, assume that indiscriminate violence eliminates any node with probability 1
n
.
The elimination of any node also leads its component to exit the network, so the payoff to
indiscriminate violence be be written in terms of component size. Specifically, the prob-
ability that a member of component i is eliminated is 1 − (n−1
n
)ci , and so the payoff to






The state therefore prefers indiscriminate violence when







I generate results through simulations. Specifically, I generate networks with n =
10000 nodes and j = 50 components, and randomly vary the sizes of the components
over 10000 simulations. With these constructed networks, I generate the expected payoff
to the state of either strategy, and compare the difference in these expected payoffs, or the
level that k would need to be for indiscriminate violence to be preferred.
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First, I note that the payoff to either strategy increases as the size of the largest compo-
nent increases. Figure 4.2 shows the relationship between the size of the largest component
(which is also the payoff to targeted violence,−k) and the expected payoff to indiscriminate
violence. This result is obvious for targeted violence, but not for indiscriminate violence.
The logic is as follows: the probability that a component is eliminated through indiscrim-
inate violence increases along with its size. As the largest component grows, it is both
more likely to be eliminated through indiscriminate violence, and its elimination is more
valuable.
However, I also show that targeted violence becomes more valuable relative to indis-
criminate violence as the size of the largest component increases. The relationship between
the size of the largest component and the difference in expected payoffs between targeted
and indiscriminate violence is shown in Figure 4.3. While increasing the size of the largest
component does increase the expected payoff of indiscriminate violence, it does so at a
rate slower than for targeted violence, which gets the payoff from eliminating the largest
component with certainty.
Third, as the standard deviation of component sizes decreases, the value of indiscrim-
inate violence increases relative to targeted violence. This is shown in Figure 4.4. This
is related to second finding: as the standard deviation of the distribution increases, there
are more components in the tails of the distribution. If the largest components are much
larger than the mean, then there is less probability that indiscriminate violence eliminates a
component or components similar to the size of the largest component. Similarly, if some
components are much smaller than the mean, there is still positive probability that indis-
criminate violence eliminates these components and not others. However, as components
are closer to the mean size, then it is more likely that indiscriminate violence will eliminate
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Figure 4.2: Relationship between size of largest component in network and expected payoff
to indiscriminate violence. The expected payoff to indiscriminate violence increases with
the size of the largest component.
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Figure 4.3: Relationship between size of the largest component and difference in expected
payoff between targeted and indiscriminate violence. As the largest component increases,
both strategies have larger expected payoffs, but the difference between the payoffs also
increases, making targeted violence relatively more effective.
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a component similar to the size of the largest component.
The variation in networks examined here reflects real world networks. In some loca-
tions, networks are extremely tight, such that there might be only one large component,
meaning that a path exists between nearly every node. For example, in homogeneous,
small villages, nearly every villager may be in a large component of essential ties with a
few isolated clusters. In such a setting, this analysis suggests that targeted violence would
be more effective, as it would eliminate the largest component despite being more costly.
Conversely, in networks that are more heterogeneous and larger, such as villages with a
multitude of ethnic groups or cities, there may be a multitude of components representing
different groups. In this setting, indiscriminate violence would in expectation accomplish
nearly the same outcome as targeted violence and be less costly.
Moreover, the assumptions made about the information available to states in such a
setup are realistic. It is likely that states would be able to identify separate components
in the network, so long as components are defined by some observable feature. For ex-
ample, social network ties are more likely as geographical distance decreases, suggesting
that neighborhoods or clusters of dwellings could proxy for components in networks. Re-
searchers should be able to identify the distribution of components in clusters as well by
collecting detailed social network data and identifying variables that predict edges or by
using community detection algorithms. Thus, a fruitful research agenda would be to empir-
ically determine the relationship between clustering in networks and strategies of violence.
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Figure 4.4: Relationship between standard deviation of component sizes and difference in
expected payoff between targeted and indiscriminate violence. As the standard deviation
increases, targeted violence is more preferred.
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4.4 Translating the results
The theory presented here suggests several comparative statics that can be tested empiri-
cally by using observable proxies. In this section, I discuss how the results of the theory
can be translated into empirical research. I focus on two variables and discuss how they can
be operationalized. The two variables are: the motivation of the most valuable node and
the degree distribution of a network. Note that the following discussion does not cover the
full universe of possible proxies, and, while in an ideal research design these proxies would
not be prone to measurement error, researchers should consider whether these proxies can
be measured without error in their research setting.
All else equal, the theory shows that as the motivation to leave the network of the most
valuable node increases, so does the value of using indiscriminate violence. This presents
two measurement problems for the state and for researchers: identifying who the most
valuable node is, and identifying their level of motivation. I consider reasonable proxies
for each in turn. First, the state and researchers must be able to identify who the most
valuable node is. In the theory, I defined the targeted node to be one that provides the most
value to other nodes in the network. A reasonable approach to identifying this node in
a real world network would be to begin with degree, as total value increases with degree
if value is always positive, as it is defined in the model. Thus, without other contextual
factors, the most valuable node would be that with the greatest number of ties. However,
with access to more information, this node could be better identified by researchers. For
instance, in networks characterized by high levels of religiosity, religious leaders may be
the most valuable node, even if other types of leaders have similar degree. In non-religious
networks, a local leader may be the most valuable. However, a researcher must take it upon
113
Chapter 4. A theory of targeted and indiscriminate state violence
in networks
themselves to define value and degree within the context they are studying.
Along with identifying the most valuable node, researchers must also be able to proxy
for their motivation. Again, a suitable proxy for motivation to leave the network depends on
the context in the study location. However, several factors may play a role in this motivation
in many contexts. First is mobility. If the location of the violence is largely isolated and
transportation infrastructure is underdeveloped, it may be less likely that members of the
network can or would wish to leave the network. Similarly, if other locations close to
where the violence is occurring are also dangerous then leaving the network may be more
costly. Conversely, these conditions may affect the distribution of motivation throughout
the network: those who can afford to travel or find safety in a new location may have
higher motivation to leave. Thus, valuable nodes who are also better off than the rest of
the network may have higher motivation than others in some situations. Along with this,
external social ties may make relocation less costly. Those who can rely on social support
in other locations may be more likely to leave. Thus, those who have relocated in the
past or who have already been displaced previously may have higher motivation to leave
the network. Similarly, those who can find others who share their same political or ethnic
identity may be more able to leave [196].
The theory also shows that as the degree distribution of the network is less uniform, tar-
geted violence becomes more effective. As argued in subsection 3.5, there are several prox-
ies for degree distribution. One is the distribution of geographical distance from the center
of the location where the network exists. When all nodes are close together geographi-
cally, it is more likely that they would have similar numbers of network ties. However, as
the geographical expanse of the network expands, it is likely that degree will vary widely
and clusters of ties may exist. Along the same lines, when the network is homogeneous
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along ethnic and religious lines, the distribution of degree may be more uniform. When
the network is less homogeneous, there may be more clusters of ties and a less uniform
distribution.
Thus, while these to variables are likely to be context dependent and suitable prox-
ies may vary across locations, they are also likely to be observable to both states and re-
searchers, given access to basic data about the makeup of the population of the network.
This suggests that (i) the level of information necessary for the state to effectively weigh
the trade-offs to the different strategies of violence in the model is realistic and (ii) that
researchers can use these findings to identify locations where certain strategies of violence
are likely to be used.
4.5 Conclusion
The central finding of this analysis is that the structure of networks plays a key role in de-
termining the most effective strategy of violence for a state. The structure of the social net-
work and the characteristics of the individuals within it determine whether a state chooses
to employ targeted and indiscriminate violence. As value to other nodes in a network and
motivation to leave a network are more positively correlated, indiscriminate violence be-
comes more valuable. As degree distribution becomes less uniform, violence in general
becomes more effective, but targeted violence is more often preferred.
The findings have implications for the study of civil wars and violence against civilians.
Primarily, it demonstrates that beyond factors like information and operational discipline,
network conditions matter in states’ choice of violence strategy. The theory presented in
this article can allow insight into settings outside violence as well. For instance, when
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states seek to relocate citizens in order to build infrastructure, there may be conditions
when offering key community leaders large incentives to leave can cause others to leave
with them. Alternatively, uniform incentives may be preferred when community leaders
are more willing to leave the community, due to pull factors. The theory may also speak to
phenomena as diverse as migration for temporary work and disaster preparedness, in that
both require individuals to make decisions to leave networks for some outside benefit.
However, it is important to note that the theory presented in this essay is not a prescrip-
tion for strategies of violence, but instead a description of the trade-offs states face when
choosing to use violence. States already use indiscriminate violence often, as shown in
Figure 4.1, and the intention of this theory is to contribute to the understanding of why this
violence takes place. Moreover, while states have access to the same data that researchers
can use in predicting and understanding patterns of violence, shedding light on how states
may use this data to commit acts of violence can allow outside observers to preempt such
attacks. Greater understanding of the deployment of different strategies of violence by
states can aid efforts to prevent these atrocities by enabling external actors to predict where
indiscriminate violence is likely to take place and act against it.
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4.6 Formal derivation of results
4.6.1 Fully connected 3-agent network
4.6.1.1 Payoff to targeted violence in a fully connected 3-agent network
The state eliminates node a and pays cost κ. b leaves the network if the edge between a
and b is essential for b, or θb > αbc.
1 + Pr(θb > αbc)− κ (4.1)
4.6.1.2 Payoff to indiscriminate violence in a fully connected 3-agent network
The utility to the state of indiscriminate violence can be written as:
Pr(a)(1 + Pr(θb > αbc))+
Pr(b)(1 + Pr(θa > αac))+
Pr(c)(1)
+Pr(a, b)(2) + Pr(a, c)(2 + Pr(θb > 0))
+Pr(c, b)(2 + Pr(θa > 0)) + 3Pr(a, b, c)
(4.2)
The probability that a alone is eliminated is the probability of a being eliminated minus
the probability that a and other nodes are eliminated. We can write the probability that a
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and Pr(a, b) = Pr(a, c) = Pr(c, b). Finally, Pr(a, b, c) = 1
27
.
Substituting, the utility to indiscriminate violence can be written as
4
27
(1 + Pr(θb > αbc))+
4
27






















(Pr(θb > αbc) + Pr(θa > αac)) +
2
27
(Pr(θb > 0) + Pr(θa > 0)) (4.4)
4.6.1.3 Comparing the payoffs to targeted and indiscriminate violence in a fully con-
nected 3-agent network





(Pr(θb > αbc) + Pr(θa > αac)) +
2
27
(Pr(θb > 0) + Pr(θa > 0))
(4.5)
which with probabilities substituted is
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4.6.2 3-agent network with 2 edges
4.6.2.1 Payoff to targeted violence in a 3-agent network with 2 edges
a is eliminated with certainty, but the action of b or c leaving the network has no further
effect. The payoff can then be written as
1 + Pr(θb > 0)− κ
4.6.2.2 Payoff to indiscriminate violence in a 3-agent network with 2 edges
The utility to indiscriminate violence can be written as:
Pr(a)(1 + Pr(θb > 0))
+Pr(b)(1 + Pr(θa > αac))
+Pr(c)(1)
+Pr(a, b)(2) + Pr(a, c)(2 + Pr(θb > 0)) + Pr(c, b)(2 + Pr(θa > 0))
+3Pr(a, b, c)
(4.8)
Substituting probabilities, I acquire
4
27
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(Pr(θb > 0)) +
2
27
(Pr(θa > 0)) +
4
27
(Pr(θa > αac)) (4.10)
4.6.2.3 Comparing the payoffs to indiscriminate violence in a 3-agent network with
2 edges
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which with probabilities substituted is
































(1− 1 + αac
1 + σa
) (4.13)
4.6.3 3-agent network with 1 edge
4.6.3.1 Payoff to targeted violence in a 3-agent network with 1 edge
a is eliminated with certainty, and spillover effects only affect the choice of b to remain in
the network or leave. The payoff to the state is written in can be written as
1 + Pr(θb > 0)− κ
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4.6.3.2 Payoff to indiscriminate violence in a 3-agent network with 1 edge
The payoff to the state is
Pr(a)(1 + Pr(θb > 0))
+Pr(b)(1 + Pr(θa > 0))
+Pr(c)(1)
+Pr(a, b)(2) + Pr(a, c)(2 + Pr(θb > 0)) + Pr(c, b)(2 + Pr(θa > 0))
+3Pr(a, b, c)
(4.14)




(Pr(θb > 0)) +
6
27
(Pr(θa > 0)) (4.15)
4.6.3.3 Comparing the payoffs repression strategies in a 3-agent network with 1 edge
The state prefers targeted repression when
1 + Pr(θb > 0)− κ ≥ 1 +
6
27
(Pr(θb > 0)) +
6
27
(Pr(θa > 0)) (4.16)
or
1 + (1− 1
1 + σb
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A.1 Research Implementation
The data for this paper was collected via face-to-face surveys implemented in 2019 in five
camps for the internally displaced near Ma Jai Yang, a relatively highly populated town in
the Non-Government Controlled Area (NGCA) in Kachin State, Myanmar. Respondents
were compensated with rain-gear for their participation. Access to the NGCA is limited for
foreigners and necessitated the hiring and training of local enumerators who could access
the study area. I enlisted the help of my research assistant to recruit enumerators from
local universities who had the ability to travel between the Government Controlled Area
(GCA) and Non-Government Controlled Area. The enumerators were trained in person
by myself and my research assistant in Myitkyina, the capital city of Kachin State in the
GCA. Enumerators were trained over a 4 day period in which the underwent ethics train-
ing, learned how to use the software for survey implementation and gave feedback on the
survey’s construction and wording.
The research assistant was present in the camps during the survey periods and was
responsible for monitoring the enumerators. The camps were located in varying distances
from Ma Jai Yang and enumerators had to travel to the camps each day, and thus could
only implement surveys during daylight hours. Moreover, the monsoon season limited
the ability to implement surveys on some days. In general, the survey implementation
was somewhat rushed– while I would have preferred that enumerators would have more
days to return to camps in order to revisit households in which no members were home,
in most cases enumerators were only able to revisit these households on subsequent days.
This, along with the lack of formal camp censuses, makes estimating non-response to the
surveys difficult.
The difficulty in implementing surveys in this environment led me to make the con-
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scious decision to simplify aspects of the survey. For example, I originally intended to
implement behavioral games along with the surveys in order to measure altruism and pro-
social behavior in ways similar to past studies. However, because the survey period was
short and the number of camps we could access limited, piloting such measures was impos-
sible and so they were discarded. The survey instrument that was ultimately implemented
was one that enumerators expressed confidence in their ability to implement effectively.
A.2 Ethical Considerations
Conducting research in conflict zones and among vulnerable populations can lead to un-
intended consequences for research subjects and researchers which can cause harm if not
properly mitigated. The researchers in such projects are responsible for conducting their
research in a way that protects the dignity and autonomy of their research subjects, and
guarantees the safety of the subjects and the research team. Here, I discuss the risks of
implementing this research project and the steps I took to address these risks.
The primary risk to research subjects in this research environment is the possibility that
sensitive information about the research subjects could spread to actors who could exploit
the information to harm the research subjects. Thus, a key consideration in implementing
the study was the protection of this information. To guarantee that this information would
not be spread, the tablets used for conducting the surveys were collected each day by the
research assistant from the enumerators and stored in the same room as the research as-
sistant overnight. Once the surveys were completed, the tablets were wiped clean of the
survey information, and the data was held only by the researcher. Moreover, the survey
was implemented in the non-goverment controlled area intentionally such that actors who
would benefit from this information would not be given access to it.
Another risk to subjects was eliciting information about their experiences with vio-
lence, which could be traumatizing for the research subjects. Several steps were taken to
mitigate this risk. First, research subjects had the ability to end the survey at any time
and enumerators were instructed to comply with such a request immediately. Second, the
questions about violence were asked in a vague manner, and respondents were not asked
to describe their specific encounters with exposure to violence. Third, enumerators were
chosen from the local population so that respondents would feel more comfortable while
taking the survey.
Finally, the enumerators faced risks in that they could be seen as potentially having
access to sensitive information. The primary approach to mitigate this risk was to con-
duct the survey in non-government controlled areas so that potentially threatening actors
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would not know that the survey was being implemented and would be unable to access
the enumerators. Along with this, as stated above, enumerators were only in possession of
this information while in the act of conducting the surveys and could never access the data
outside of the IDP camps.
A.3 Sampling
The sampling approach in this data collection effort was dictated by (i) limited access to
camps in the Non-Government Controlled Area (NGCA) and (ii) a lack of data on the
NGCA and camp populations. Data collection was restricted to IDP camps in which the
researcher could gain approval to conduct the survey. Approval was gained by directly con-
tacting camp managers through local social networks. Because of this limitation, camps
could not be randomly sampled. Before the study was conducted, permission was gained
to survey IDPs in camps near the village Mai Ja Yang. Ultimately, the survey was imple-
mented in 5 camps near Mai Ja Yang in the NGCA of Kachin State.
Within camps, enumerators were instructed to survey the full household population in
order to construct full networks. Informed consent was obtained from each respondent
before the survey was administered, and enumerators were instructed to halt the survey at
respondents’ request. Because there was no roster to follow for surveying, enumerators
went household to household and knocked on every door. They were instructed to return
to households that were not present for surveying on subsequent days. Households were
ultimately missing from the sample if they were not present for all days of the survey or
if they declined to take the survey. Because IDP camps are by their nature temporary, it
was impossible to determine for all households in the camps if there was a family residing
there. Other than not wishing to participate, reasons for being absent from the sample were
temporarily being away from the camp, abandoned households, and all adults being away
from the household during possible surveying hours. Because enumerators were not from
the camps and did not stay there, enumeration was only possible during daylight hours.
A.4 Social Network Data Construction
The social network data was collected and cleaned as follows. Respondents were asked
to describe several social networks as shown in the survey instrument. Along with giving
the names of alters, respondents were asked (i) if the alter was a member of their family
and (ii) to estimate the age of the alter. For each type of network, respondents were able to
name up to five names. A census approach was not possible because of the lack of correct
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household rosters in the camps, and so the name generator approach was the only possible
one. While this limits the size of the networks, edges can be seen as the most salient ones
for a respondent. The challenge in cleaning the data was to determine which alters were
the same as each other and as egos given the similarity of names, potential misspellings
and the size of the social network data. To minimize false positive and false negatives, the
following procedure was used.
First, a dataset of egos was constructed with names and recorded ages of egos. 8 egos
could not be distinguished because they had the same name, age, and camp, and so were
removed. Then, a second dataset of alters was constructed of names and estimated ages (by
egos for alters). Then, the R package fastLink was used to match observations based on
the similarity of their names and ages. Matches were then grouped and transformed into a
unique identification number. Following this, the original identifiers in the dataframe were
replaced with the new identification number. After the automated cleaning process was
complete, matches were checked by the researcher and deemed to be suitable.
The networks constructed in this way are closed, meaning that an edge between two
nodes only exists if both nodes were interviewed. The automated nature of the cleaning
process inevitably risks measurement error, but the node-level variables (degree-centrality)
constructed are robust to measurement error from (i) coded links that may not exist and (ii)
coded nodes that may not exist [197].
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A.5 Tabular results for regression of well-being outcomes
and network degree
Table A.1: Tabular results for regression of well-being out-
comes and network degree. Those with higher degree in the
close ties network are less likely to express fear walking at
night and more likely to be able to borrow from community
members.
Measure Coefficient SE p-value CI Low CI High n
Fear walking at night -0.0165 0.0061 0.0538 -0.0284 -0.0045 635
Borrow from community if needed 0.0113 0.0010 0.0003 0.0094 0.0133 611
A.6 Network summary statistics by camp
Table A.2: Summary Statistics for initial ties networks by
camp.
Camp Num. Dyads Num. Edges Prop. Edges Num. Mutual Edges
1 6110 168 0.0275 36
2 2810 63 0.0224 12
3 302 5 0.0166 0
8 142 6 0.0423 0
9 132 3 0.0227 0
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Table A.3: Summary Statistics for new ties networks by
camp.
Camp Num. Dyads Num. Edges Prop. Edges Num. Mutual Edges
1 55460 207 0.0037 34
2 75350 176 0.0023 24
3 3540 27 0.0076 2
8 1260 15 0.0119 2
9 552 14 0.0254 2
Table A.4: Summary statistics for close ties networks by
camp.
Camp Num. Dyads Num. Edges Prop. Edges Num. Mutual Edges
1 55460 252 0.0045 38
2 75350 158 0.0021 24
3 3540 20 0.0056 0
8 1260 16 0.0127 2
9 552 11 0.0199 0
A.7 Elicitation of Names Summary Statistics
Table A.5: Summary statistics for names given by network.
Network Mean Names SD Names Min Names Median Names Max Names
Close Ties Names 3.663 1.579 0 4 5
New Ties Names 3.583 1.603 0 4 5
Initial Ties Names 3.317 1.778 0 4 5
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A.8 Tabular results of balance regressions
Table A.6: Tabular results showing balance on pre-treatment
covariates for exposure at the extensive margin.
Covariate Estimate SE p-value CI Low CI High N
Age 0.0020 0.0012 0.1075 -0.0004 0.0043 631
Female? -0.0888 0.0547 0.1049 -0.1959 0.0184 631
Married? 0.0003 0.0762 0.9964 -0.1491 0.1498 631
Baptist? -0.0102 0.0389 0.7929 -0.0864 0.0660 631
Catholic? 0.0232 0.0390 0.5517 -0.0532 0.0996 631
Above primary education? -0.0828 0.0388 0.0333 -0.1589 -0.0067 628
Jinghpaw? -0.1704 0.0500 0.0007 -0.2684 -0.0724 631
Minutes walk to town 0.0011 0.0008 0.1794 -0.0005 0.0027 629
Large house? 0.0757 0.0447 0.0910 -0.0119 0.1634 629
Household size 0.0024 0.0075 0.7505 -0.0123 0.0170 629
Land (Sq. Feet) 0.0000 0.0000 0.2455 0.0000 0.0000 624
Village leader? -0.0659 0.0796 0.4086 -0.2220 0.0902 631
Income (MMK) 0.0000 0.0000 0.9674 0.0000 0.0000 591
Table A.7: Tabular results showing balance on pre-treatment
covariates for exposure at the intensive margin.
Covariate Estimate SE p-value CI Low CI High N
Age -0.0018 0.0021 0.4039 -0.0059 0.0024 240
Female? 0.0333 0.0553 0.5491 -0.0751 0.1416 240
Married? 0.0311 0.1265 0.8062 -0.2168 0.2790 240
Baptist? 0.0569 0.0784 0.4699 -0.0967 0.2104 240
Catholic? -0.0768 0.0776 0.3245 -0.2289 0.0752 240
Above primary education? -0.0807 0.0553 0.1475 -0.1891 0.0276 237
Jinghpaw? 0.1022 0.1014 0.3163 -0.0966 0.3009 240
Minutes walk to town -0.0003 0.0011 0.7975 -0.0025 0.0019 240
Large house? 0.1182 0.0832 0.1587 -0.0448 0.2813 239
Household size 0.0074 0.0123 0.5486 -0.0167 0.0315 240
Land (Sq. Feet) 0.0000 0.0000 0.3177 0.0000 0.0000 237
Village leader? 0.1569 0.1269 0.2195 -0.0918 0.4056 240
Income (MMK) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0586 0.0000 0.0000 221
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A.9 Network graphs for all 15 networks
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Figure A.1: Networks for camp 1
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Figure A.2: Networks for camp 2
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Figure A.3: Networks for camp 3
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Figure A.4: Networks for camp 4
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Figure A.5: Networks for camp 5
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A.10 Tabular results of selection on observables approach
on extensive margin
Table A.8: Tabular results for effects of exposure to violence
on the extensive margin on degree in networks. Unbalanced
covariates included.
Outcome Variable Estimate SE p-value CI Low CI High N
Initial ties degree Exposed -0.3006 0.1314 0.0234 -0.5580 -0.0431 622
Initial ties outdegree Exposed -0.1508 0.0697 0.0319 -0.2874 -0.0143 622
Initial ties indegree Exposed -0.1497 0.0719 0.0389 -0.2907 -0.0088 622
New ties degree Exposed -0.3963 0.1308 0.0029 -0.6527 -0.1399 622
New ties outdegree Exposed -0.2697 0.0881 0.0026 -0.4425 -0.0970 622
New ties indegree Exposed -0.1266 0.0763 0.0992 -0.2762 0.0230 622
Close ties degree Exposed -0.2746 0.1322 0.0394 -0.5337 -0.0155 622
Close ties outdegree Exposed -0.2322 0.0724 0.0016 -0.3740 -0.0903 622
Close ties indegree Exposed -0.0424 0.0900 0.6379 -0.2189 0.1340 622
A.11 Tabular results for selection on observables approach
on extensive margin robustness
A.11.1 Results for regressions with no covariates
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Table A.9: Tabular results for effects of exposure to violence
on the extensive margin on degree in networks. No covari-
ates included.
Outcome Variable Estimate SE p-value CI Low CI High N
Initial ties degree Exposed -0.3053 0.1290 0.0192 -0.5581 -0.0524 625
Initial ties outdegree Exposed -0.1561 0.0700 0.0272 -0.2934 -0.0189 625
Initial ties indegree Exposed -0.1491 0.0689 0.0319 -0.2841 -0.0141 625
New ties degree Exposed -0.4527 0.1337 0.0009 -0.7147 -0.1907 625
New ties outdegree Exposed -0.2846 0.0891 0.0017 -0.4593 -0.1100 625
New ties indegree Exposed -0.1681 0.0777 0.0320 -0.3204 -0.0158 625
Close ties degree Exposed -0.3471 0.1296 0.0082 -0.6010 -0.0931 625
Close ties outdegree Exposed -0.2649 0.0714 0.0003 -0.4048 -0.1250 625
Close ties indegree Exposed -0.0822 0.0871 0.3469 -0.2529 0.0885 625
A.11.2 Results for regressions with all measured pre-treatment co-
variates
Table A.10: Tabular results for effects of exposure to vio-
lence on the extensive margin on degree in networks. All
covariates included.
Outcome Variable Estimate SE p-value CI Low CI High N
Initial ties degree Exposed -0.3278 0.1242 0.0092 -0.5712 -0.0845 575
Initial ties outdegree Exposed -0.1549 0.0608 0.0118 -0.2740 -0.0357 575
Initial ties indegree Exposed -0.1729 0.0737 0.0203 -0.3174 -0.0285 575
New ties degree Exposed -0.2775 0.1282 0.0320 -0.5287 -0.0263 575
New ties outdegree Exposed -0.2381 0.0839 0.0052 -0.4025 -0.0736 575
New ties indegree Exposed -0.0394 0.0793 0.6197 -0.1949 0.1160 575
Close ties degree Exposed -0.2243 0.1366 0.1027 -0.4921 0.0435 575
Close ties outdegree Exposed -0.2118 0.0710 0.0033 -0.3511 -0.0726 575
Close ties indegree Exposed -0.0125 0.0991 0.9000 -0.2068 0.1818 575
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A.12 Tabular results for extensive margin alternative ex-
planations
Table A.11: Effect of having been from a village that experi-
enced violence but having fled before the violence occurred
on degree in the initial ties network. There is no effect sig-
nificant at conventional levels.
Outcome Variable Estimate SE p-value N
Initial ties degree Village attacked but fled 0.2017 0.2377 0.398 383
Table A.12: Effect of having been in the village during vio-
lence compared to those who fled before violence occurred
on indicators of social status with village fixed effects. There
is no effect significant at conventional levels.
Outcome Variable Estimate SE p-value N
Invite many wedding guests Left village after violence 0.0229 0.0345 0.5082 392
Opinion respected in village? Left village after violence -0.0188 0.0637 0.7689 320
Household size in village Left village after violence 0.5031 0.2980 0.0938 394
Leader in village? Left village after violence -0.0405 0.0353 0.2530 395
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Table A.13: Effect of exposure to violence on days since
arriving to the camp with unbalanced covariates and pre-
displacement village fixed effects. There is no effect sig-
nificant at conventional levels.
Outcome Variable Estimate SE p-value N
Days since arriving in camp Exposure 155.7 104 0.1364 622
Table A.14: Relationship between exposure to violence and
number of surveyed IDPs from the same village. There is no
effect significant at conventional levels.
Outcome Variable Estimate SE p-value N
Num. IDPs from village in camp Exposure 1.164 1.715 0.4984 622
Table A.15: Effect of exposure to violence on the exten-
sive margin on the number of names given in the survey
for each network type with unbalanced covariates and pre-
displacement village fixed effects. The results correspond to
those found for degree.
Outcome Variable Estimate SE p-value CI Low CI High N
Initial ties names given Exposed -0.4344 0.1537 0.0053 -0.7356 -0.1332 622
New ties names given Exposed -0.2762 0.1521 0.0713 -0.5744 0.0219 622
Close ties names given Exposed -0.3276 0.1750 0.0631 -0.6706 0.0155 622
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Table A.16: Effect of exposure to violence on the number of
names given that are relatives. Those exposed to violence do
not give less names of relatives, meaning the effects on de-
gree do not operate solely through smaller family networks
in the camps.
Outcome Variable Estimate SE p-value N
Num. relatives named for initial ties network Exposure -0.1597 0.1765 0.3670 622
Num. relatives named for close ties network Exposure 0.2114 0.1609 0.1907 622
Ratio relatives to total names for initial ties network Exposure 0.0261 0.0444 0.5577 552
Ratio relatives to total names for close ties network Exposure 0.1052 0.0348 0.0030 587
A.13 Tabular results of selection on observables approach
on intensive margin
Table A.17: Tabular results for effects of exposure to vio-
lence on the intensive margin on degree in networks.
Outcome Variable Estimate SE p-value CI Low CI High N
Initial ties degree Exposed -0.1453 0.1796 0.4205 -0.4974 0.2067 240
Initial ties outdegree Exposed 0.0933 0.1035 0.3697 -0.1096 0.2962 240
Initial ties indegree Exposed -0.2566 0.1931 0.1872 -0.6350 0.1218 240
New ties degree Exposed -0.7661 0.3917 0.0536 -1.5338 0.0015 240
New ties outdegree Exposed 0.0285 0.1379 0.8366 -0.2418 0.2989 240
New ties indegree Exposed -0.7947 0.3627 0.0310 -1.5056 -0.0837 240
Close ties degree Exposed -0.5722 0.4973 0.2530 -1.5469 0.4025 240
Close ties outdegree Exposed -0.0147 0.1554 0.9251 -0.3191 0.2898 240
Close ties indegree Exposed -0.5575 0.4394 0.2078 -1.4188 0.3037 240
A.14 Tabular results of selection on observables approach
on intensive margin robustness
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Table A.18: Tabular results for effects of exposure to vio-
lence on the intensive margin on degree in networks, condi-
tioning on all measured pre-treatment covariates.
Outcome Variable Estimate SE p-value CI Low CI High N
Initial ties degree Exposed -0.1373 0.1841 0.4577 -0.4981 0.2235 217
Initial ties outdegree Exposed 0.1110 0.1247 0.3757 -0.1333 0.3554 217
Initial ties indegree Exposed -0.2484 0.1851 0.1832 -0.6112 0.1144 217
New ties degree Exposed -1.2076 0.3791 0.0020 -1.9507 -0.4646 217
New ties outdegree Exposed -0.0852 0.0945 0.3697 -0.2705 0.1000 217
New ties indegree Exposed -1.1224 0.3763 0.0037 -1.8599 -0.3849 217
Close ties degree Exposed -0.7751 0.5104 0.1326 -1.7754 0.2252 217
Close ties outdegree Exposed -0.0022 0.1436 0.9877 -0.2836 0.2791 217
Close ties indegree Exposed -0.7729 0.4760 0.1082 -1.7058 0.1600 217
A.15 Tabular results of dyadic regression
Table A.19: Tabular results for dyadic regression analyzing
the effect of exposure to violence in a dyad on the proba-
bility that a tie exists with camp fixed effects. Results are
consistent with the selection on observables approach.
Network Coefficient SE p-value CI Low CI High N
1 New Ties -0.0018 5e-04 0.0005 -0.0028 -8e-04 136162
11 Close Ties -0.0017 6e-04 0.0042 -0.0028 -5e-04 136162
A.16 Tabular results of homophily regressions
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Table A.20: Tabular results for dyadic regression analyzing
the effect of having the same level of exposure to violence
in a dyad on the probability that a tie exists with camp fixed
effects.
Measure Coefficient SE p-value CI Low CI High N
Same exposure status 0.0013 4e-04 0.0013 5e-04 0.0021 136162
Table A.21: Tabular results for dyadic regression analyzing
the shared levels of exposure to violence in a dyad on the
probability that a tie exists with camp fixed effects.
Measure Coefficient SE p-value CI Low CI High N
Neither exposed 0.0018 5e-04 0.0004 8e-04 0.0029 136162
Both exposed 0.0001 5e-04 0.7640 -8e-04 0.0011 136162
A.17 Tabular results of mechanism regressions
Table A.22: Tabular results for regression evaluating the ef-
fect of exposure to violence on fear.
Outcome Measure Coefficient SE T-stat p-value N
Fear walking at night Extensive margin 0.0963 0.0515 1.870 0.0633 622
Fear walking at night Intensive margin 0.1833 0.0926 1.980 0.0508 240
Feel threat due to conflict Extensive margin 0.0962 0.0476 2.022 0.0449 604
Feel threat due to conflict Intensive margin 0.1508 0.0948 1.590 0.1153 236
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Table A.23: Tabular results for regression evaluating the ef-
fect of exposure to violence on value of ties.
Outcome Measure Coefficient SE T-stat p-value N
Diff. in income Extensive margin -0.6466 1.4404 -0.4489 0.6542 557
Diff. in income Intensive margin -4.0965 2.8958 -1.4146 0.1611 209
Sharing increases security Extensive margin 0.0181 0.0137 1.3257 0.1869 597
Sharing increases security Intensive margin 0.0250 0.0421 0.5943 0.5538 227
Community mitigates risk Extensive margin -0.0315 0.0213 -1.4790 0.1412 575
Community mitigates risk Intensive margin -0.0059 0.0613 -0.0967 0.9232 222
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B.1 Description of Quota Sampling Approach
To obtain a representative sample of IDPs in Ukraine, I employed a quota sampling ap-
proach using Facebook advertisements. 150 strata were created based on 25 regions, 3 age
groups (18-33, 33-59, and 60 plus) and gender. The distribution of IDPs by gender and
region was acquired from UNHCR data and the distribution of IDP ages was acquired from
IOM data. Budgets for Facebook advertisements targeted at each of the strata were then
created proportionally to the desired percentage for each strata. The advertisements were
also targeted at those who were ‘away from their hometown’ according to Facebook data.
The advertisement, displayed below, was run in both Ukrainian and Russian depending on
the user’s set language. The advertisement promised an opportunity to win an iPad for
participating in the survey.
After the end of the data collection period, 95/150 strata were at least partially filled.
The non-filled strata were those with a small number of potential subjects, accounting for
only 4.7% of the intended sample. The data was weighted in the main analyzes to account
for differences between the desired and realized strata percentages in the sample.
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Figure B.1: Ukrainian version of Facebook ad used for recruitment. The English translation
of the caption is: “Are you an internally displaced person in Ukraine? If so, you are invited
to participate in our survey. You could win an iPad! Follow this link.” A Russian version
of the ad was used as well.
B.2 Facebook advertisement
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B.3 Quota sampling strata
Region Gender Age Range Quota Percent Sample Percent
Cherkaska Female 18-33 0.1015 0.0000
Cherkaska Female 34-59 0.1989 0.1339
Cherkaska Female 60 Plus 0.1096 0.1339
Cherkaska Male 18-33 0.0823 0.0000
Cherkaska Male 34-59 0.1613 0.1339
Cherkaska Male 60 Plus 0.0888 0.0000
Chernihivska Female 18-33 0.0692 0.1339
Chernihivska Female 34-59 0.1355 0.2677
Chernihivska Female 60 Plus 0.0747 0.1339
Chernihivska Male 18-33 0.0554 0.1339
Chernihivska Male 34-59 0.1087 0.0000
Chernihivska Male 60 Plus 0.0599 0.2677
Chernivetska Female 18-33 0.0232 0.0000
Chernivetska Female 34-59 0.0454 0.0000
Chernivetska Female 60 Plus 0.0250 0.0000
Chernivetska Male 18-33 0.0178 0.0000
Chernivetska Male 34-59 0.0348 0.0000
Chernivetska Male 60 Plus 0.0192 0.0000
Dnipropetrovska Female 18-33 0.6889 0.5355
Dnipropetrovska Female 34-59 1.3503 1.2048
Dnipropetrovska Female 60 Plus 0.7438 0.1339
Dnipropetrovska Male 18-33 0.5276 0.1339
Dnipropetrovska Male 34-59 1.0342 1.4726
Dnipropetrovska Male 60 Plus 0.5696 0.2677
Donetska Female 18-33 5.1980 3.4806
Donetska Female 34-59 10.1890 13.3869
Donetska Female 60 Plus 5.6120 2.9451
Donetska Male 18-33 3.4899 2.0080
Donetska Male 34-59 6.8409 9.2369
Donetska Male 60 Plus 3.7679 2.8112
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(continued)
Region Gender Age Range Quota Percent Sample Percent
Ivano-Frankivska Female 18-33 0.0361 0.1339
Ivano-Frankivska Female 34-59 0.0707 0.0000
Ivano-Frankivska Female 60 Plus 0.0389 0.0000
Ivano-Frankivska Male 18-33 0.0292 0.1339
Ivano-Frankivska Male 34-59 0.0572 0.0000
Ivano-Frankivska Male 60 Plus 0.0315 0.1339
Kharkivska Female 18-33 1.2932 0.5355
Kharkivska Female 34-59 2.5350 2.8112
Kharkivska Female 60 Plus 1.3962 0.6693
Kharkivska Male 18-33 1.0058 0.5355
Kharkivska Male 34-59 1.9716 1.4726
Kharkivska Male 60 Plus 1.0860 0.6693
Khersonska Female 18-33 0.1266 0.0000
Khersonska Female 34-59 0.2482 0.2677
Khersonska Female 60 Plus 0.1367 0.0000
Khersonska Male 18-33 0.1202 0.0000
Khersonska Male 34-59 0.2357 0.0000
Khersonska Male 60 Plus 0.1298 0.0000
Khmelnytska Female 18-33 0.0635 0.2677
Khmelnytska Female 34-59 0.1244 0.4016
Khmelnytska Female 60 Plus 0.0685 0.1339
Khmelnytska Male 18-33 0.0481 0.0000
Khmelnytska Male 34-59 0.0943 0.0000
Khmelnytska Male 60 Plus 0.0519 0.0000
Kirovohradska Female 18-33 0.0625 0.0000
Kirovohradska Female 34-59 0.1225 0.2677
Kirovohradska Female 60 Plus 0.0675 0.0000
Kirovohradska Male 18-33 0.0486 0.0000
Kirovohradska Male 34-59 0.0953 0.0000
Kirovohradska Male 60 Plus 0.0525 0.0000
Kyiv Female 18-33 1.5990 1.2048
Kyiv Female 34-59 3.1344 2.8112
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(continued)
Region Gender Age Range Quota Percent Sample Percent
Kyiv Female 60 Plus 1.7264 1.2048
Kyiv Male 18-33 1.1598 1.2048
Kyiv Male 34-59 2.2735 3.4806
Kyiv Male 60 Plus 1.2522 0.4016
Kyivska Female 18-33 0.6368 0.5355
Kyivska Female 34-59 1.2483 2.9451
Kyivska Female 60 Plus 0.6875 1.6064
Kyivska Male 18-33 0.4674 0.1339
Kyivska Male 34-59 0.9162 2.6774
Kyivska Male 60 Plus 0.5047 0.6693
Luhanska Female 18-33 2.8867 1.3387
Luhanska Female 34-59 5.6584 6.1580
Luhanska Female 60 Plus 3.1167 0.6693
Luhanska Male 18-33 1.8942 1.3387
Luhanska Male 34-59 3.7129 5.3548
Luhanska Male 60 Plus 2.0451 0.9371
Lvivska Female 18-33 0.1071 0.1339
Lvivska Female 34-59 0.2100 0.5355
Lvivska Female 60 Plus 0.1157 0.1339
Lvivska Male 18-33 0.0825 0.1339
Lvivska Male 34-59 0.1617 0.1339
Lvivska Male 60 Plus 0.0891 0.0000
Mykolaivska Female 18-33 0.0785 0.0000
Mykolaivska Female 34-59 0.1538 0.5355
Mykolaivska Female 60 Plus 0.0847 0.0000
Mykolaivska Male 18-33 0.0626 0.0000
Mykolaivska Male 34-59 0.1226 0.0000
Mykolaivska Male 60 Plus 0.0676 0.0000
Odeska Female 18-33 0.3778 0.0000
Odeska Female 34-59 0.7405 0.6693
Odeska Female 60 Plus 0.4079 0.1339
Odeska Male 18-33 0.2739 0.0000
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(continued)
Region Gender Age Range Quota Percent Sample Percent
Odeska Male 34-59 0.5369 0.4016
Odeska Male 60 Plus 0.2957 0.1339
Poltavska Female 18-33 0.2191 0.4016
Poltavska Female 34-59 0.4295 0.6693
Poltavska Female 60 Plus 0.2366 0.2677
Poltavska Male 18-33 0.1653 0.1339
Poltavska Male 34-59 0.3240 0.4016
Poltavska Male 60 Plus 0.1785 0.5355
Rivnenska Female 18-33 0.0286 0.0000
Rivnenska Female 34-59 0.0561 0.0000
Rivnenska Female 60 Plus 0.0309 0.0000
Rivnenska Male 18-33 0.0229 0.0000
Rivnenska Male 34-59 0.0448 0.0000
Rivnenska Male 60 Plus 0.0247 0.0000
Sumska Female 18-33 0.1085 0.0000
Sumska Female 34-59 0.2127 0.5355
Sumska Female 60 Plus 0.1172 0.0000
Sumska Male 18-33 0.0824 0.0000
Sumska Male 34-59 0.1615 0.0000
Sumska Male 60 Plus 0.0889 0.0000
Ternopilska Female 18-33 0.0207 0.0000
Ternopilska Female 34-59 0.0406 0.0000
Ternopilska Female 60 Plus 0.0224 0.0000
Ternopilska Male 18-33 0.0158 0.0000
Ternopilska Male 34-59 0.0310 0.0000
Ternopilska Male 60 Plus 0.0171 0.0000
Vinnytska Female 18-33 0.1095 0.0000
Vinnytska Female 34-59 0.2146 0.4016
Vinnytska Female 60 Plus 0.1182 0.2677
Vinnytska Male 18-33 0.0838 0.0000
Vinnytska Male 34-59 0.1642 0.2677
Vinnytska Male 60 Plus 0.0904 0.2677
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(continued)
Region Gender Age Range Quota Percent Sample Percent
Volynska Female 18-33 0.0287 0.0000
Volynska Female 34-59 0.0562 0.0000
Volynska Female 60 Plus 0.0310 0.0000
Volynska Male 18-33 0.0239 0.0000
Volynska Male 34-59 0.0468 0.0000
Volynska Male 60 Plus 0.0258 0.0000
Zakarpatska Female 18-33 0.0323 0.0000
Zakarpatska Female 34-59 0.0634 0.1339
Zakarpatska Female 60 Plus 0.0349 0.0000
Zakarpatska Male 18-33 0.0249 0.0000
Zakarpatska Male 34-59 0.0487 0.1339
Zakarpatska Male 60 Plus 0.0268 0.0000
Zaporizka Female 18-33 0.5421 0.5355
Zaporizka Female 34-59 1.0626 0.9371
Zaporizka Female 60 Plus 0.5853 0.1339
Zaporizka Male 18-33 0.4111 0.1339
Zaporizka Male 34-59 0.8058 1.0710
Zaporizka Male 60 Plus 0.4439 0.1339
Zhytomyrska Female 18-33 0.0675 0.1339
Zhytomyrska Female 34-59 0.1323 0.5355
Zhytomyrska Female 60 Plus 0.0729 0.1339
Zhytomyrska Male 18-33 0.0526 0.0000
Zhytomyrska Male 34-59 0.1030 0.0000
Zhytomyrska Male 60 Plus 0.0568 0.1339
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B.4 Summary statistics for integration outcomes
NUnique PercentMissing Mean SD Min Median Max
Integration index 7 22 2.86 1.63 0.00 3.00 5.00
Feel close connection to location 3 13 0.44 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00
Rarely feel like an outsider 3 13 0.56 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00
Rarely feel isolated 3 13 0.56 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00
Above average favors from locals 3 21 0.46 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00
Can get help from local non-IDPs 3 21 0.75 0.43 0.00 1.00 1.00
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B.5 Summary statistics for trauma outcomes
NUnique PercentMissing Mean SD Min Median Max
PTSD or CPTSD diagnosis 3 14 0.19 0.39 0.00 0.00 1.00
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B.6 Summary statistics for timeframe outcomes
NUnique PercentMissing Mean SD Min Median Max
Can return now? 3 26 0.42 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00
Pre-displacement location safe? 3 26 0.35 0.48 0.00 0.00 1.00
Plan to return soon? 3 26 0.10 0.30 0.00 0.00 1.00
Hope to return at all? 3 26 0.45 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00
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B.7 Summary statistics for employment outcomes
NUnique PercentMissing Mean SD Min Median Max
Currently employed? 3 4 0.62 0.49 0.00 1.00 1.00
Secured stable employment? 3 5 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00
Job matches skill set? 3 41 0.60 0.49 0.00 1.00 1.00
173
Appendix B. Appendix for Conflict and social integration among
the forcibly displaced: Theory and evidence from Ukraine
B.8 Tabular results for balance regressions
Table B.2: Balance regressions with pre-displacement city
fixed effects. Three covariates predict exposure to violence:
pre-treatment income, gender, ane education.
Outcome Variable Estimate SE p-value N
Exposure to violence Age 0.0000 0.0009 0.9877 597
Exposure to violence Household size -0.0049 0.0047 0.2976 495
Exposure to violence Pre-displacement income (10,000 UAH) -0.0050 0.0004 0.0000 536
Exposure to violence Highly social? 0.0371 0.0459 0.4208 594
Exposure to violence Male? 0.0531 0.0248 0.0346 597
Exposure to violence Married? -0.0915 0.0523 0.0834 590
Exposure to violence College degree? 0.0775 0.0367 0.0374 590
Exposure to violence Distance from town 0.0000 0.0000 0.8813 577
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B.9 Tabular results for base fixed effect regressions
B.9.1 Exposure to violence and integration
Table B.3: Effect of exposure to violence on integration out-
comes using pre-displacement locality fixed effects.
Outcome Variable Estimate SE p-value CI Low CI High N
Integration index Direct exposure to violence -0.3234 0.1204 0.0085 -0.5594 -0.0874 516
Feel close connection to community Direct exposure to violence 0.0438 0.0659 0.5075 -0.0854 0.1731 561
Rarely feel like an outsider Direct exposure to violence -0.1515 0.0462 0.0014 -0.2420 -0.0610 560
Rarely feel isolated Direct exposure to violence -0.1290 0.0386 0.0012 -0.2047 -0.0533 562
Above average favors from locals Direct exposure to violence 0.0101 0.0433 0.8166 -0.0748 0.0950 519
Can get help from local non-IDPS Direct exposure to violence -0.0627 0.0363 0.0876 -0.1338 0.0085 519
B.9.2 Exposure to violence and trauma outcomes
Table B.4: Effect of exposure to violence on trauma out-
comes using pre-displacement locality fixed effects.
Outcome Variable Estimate SE p-value CI Low CI High N
PTSD or CPTSD diagnosis Direct exposure to violence 0.0825 0.0366 0.0263 0.0108 0.1543 567
B.9.3 Exposure to violence and timeframe outcomes
Table B.5: Effect of exposure to violence on timeframe out-
comes using pre-displacement locality fixed effects.
Outcome Variable Estimate SE p-value CI Low CI High N
Can return now? Direct exposure to violence -0.0783 0.0565 0.1696 -0.1891 0.0326 491
Pre−displacement location safe? Direct exposure to violence -0.1136 0.0500 0.0254 -0.2115 -0.0156 494
Plan to return soon? Direct exposure to violence 0.0343 0.0420 0.4160 -0.0480 0.1165 494
Hope to return at all? Direct exposure to violence 0.0547 0.0651 0.4028 -0.0729 0.1824 494
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B.10 Robustness: Conditioning on unbalanced covariates
B.10.1 Violence and integration conditioning on unbalanced pre-treatment
covariates
Table B.6: Effect of exposure to violence on integration out-
comes using pre-displacement locality fixed effects and con-
ditioning on unbalanced covariates.
Outcome Variable Estimate SE p-value CI Low CI High N
Integration index Direct exposure to violence -0.495 0.136 0.000 -0.761 -0.228 461
Feel close connection to community Direct exposure to violence -0.048 0.059 0.413 -0.163 0.067 503
Rarely feel like an outsider Direct exposure to violence -0.193 0.059 0.001 -0.309 -0.078 502
Rarely feel isolated Direct exposure to violence -0.153 0.055 0.007 -0.262 -0.045 504
Above average favors from locals Direct exposure to violence -0.009 0.048 0.851 -0.103 0.085 464
Can get help from local non-IDPS Direct exposure to violence -0.027 0.059 0.650 -0.144 0.089 463
B.10.2 Violence and trauma conditioning on unbalanced pre-treatment
covariates
Table B.7: Effect of exposure to violence on trauma out-
comes using pre-displacement locality fixed effects and con-
ditioning on unbalanced covariates.
Outcome Variable Estimate SE p-value CI Low CI High N
PTSD or CPTSD diagnosis Direct exposure to violence 0.105 0.061 0.09 -0.015 0.225 506
B.10.3 Violence and timeframes conditioning on unbalanced pre-treatment
covariates
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Table B.8: Effect of exposure to violence on timeframe out-
comes using pre-displacement locality fixed effects and con-
ditioning on unbalanced covariates.
Outcome Variable Estimate SE p-value CI Low CI High N
Can return now? Direct exposure to violence -0.0391 0.0715 0.5859 -0.1792 0.1010 439
Pre−displacement location safe? Direct exposure to violence -0.0440 0.0576 0.4478 -0.1569 0.0690 442
Plan to return soon? Direct exposure to violence 0.0503 0.0403 0.2149 -0.0286 0.1292 442
Hope to return at all? Direct exposure to violence 0.0901 0.0533 0.0946 -0.0144 0.1945 442
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B.11 Robustness: Conditioning on all covariates
B.11.1 Violence and integration conditioning on all pre-treatment co-
variates
Table B.9: Effect of exposure to violence on integration out-
comes using pre-displacement locality fixed effects and con-
ditioning on all measured covariates.
Outcome Variable Estimate SE p-value CI Low CI High N
Integration index Direct exposure to violence -0.538 0.117 0.000 -0.766 -0.309 385
Feel close connection to community Direct exposure to violence 0.017 0.035 0.626 -0.051 0.085 412
Rarely feel like an outsider Direct exposure to violence -0.238 0.044 0.000 -0.324 -0.152 411
Rarely feel isolated Direct exposure to violence -0.173 0.058 0.004 -0.287 -0.059 413
Above average favors from locals Direct exposure to violence 0.023 0.042 0.590 -0.059 0.104 388
Can get help from local non-IDPS Direct exposure to violence -0.061 0.056 0.279 -0.170 0.048 387
B.11.2 Violence and trauma conditioning on all pre-treatment covari-
ates
Table B.10: Effect of exposure to violence on trauma out-
comes using pre-displacement locality fixed effects and con-
ditioning on all measured covariates.
Outcome Variable Estimate SE p-value CI Low CI High N
PTSD or CPTSD diagnosis Direct exposure to violence 0.144 0.06 0.019 0.026 0.262 415
B.11.3 Violence and timeframes conditioning on all pre-treatment co-
variates
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Table B.11: Effect of exposure to violence on timeframe out-
comes using pre-displacement locality fixed effects and con-
ditioning on all measured covariates.
Outcome Variable Estimate SE p-value CI Low CI High N
Can return now? Direct exposure to violence -0.0616 0.0770 0.4263 -0.2125 0.0893 369
Pre−displacement location safe? Direct exposure to violence -0.0749 0.0582 0.2021 -0.1890 0.0391 371
Plan to return soon? Direct exposure to violence 0.0617 0.0448 0.1729 -0.0261 0.1494 371
Hope to return at all? Direct exposure to violence 0.0801 0.0477 0.0976 -0.0134 0.1736 371
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B.12 Robustness: Adding displacecement year fixed ef-
fects
B.12.1 Violence and integration with displacement year fixed effects
Table B.12: Effect of exposure to violence on integration
outcomes using pre-displacement locality and displacement
year fixed effects.
Outcome Variable Estimate SE p-value CI Low CI High N
Integration index Personal exposure to violence -0.237 0.129 0.067 -0.489 0.015 497
Feel close connection to community Personal exposure to violence -0.001 0.055 0.992 -0.109 0.107 537
Rarely feel like an outsider Personal exposure to violence -0.160 0.056 0.005 -0.269 -0.050 536
Rarely feel isolated Personal exposure to violence -0.104 0.045 0.023 -0.193 -0.015 538
Above average favors from locals Personal exposure to violence 0.060 0.056 0.281 -0.049 0.169 500
Can get help from local non-IDPS Personal exposure to violence -0.046 0.048 0.332 -0.140 0.047 500
B.12.2 Violence and trauma with displacement year fixed effects
Table B.13: Effect of exposure to violence on trauma out-
comes using pre-displacement locality and displacement
year fixed effects.
Outcome Variable Estimate SE p-value CI Low CI High N
PTSD or CPTSD diagnosis Direct exposure to violence 0.086 0.055 0.118 -0.021 0.193 543
B.12.3 Violence and timeframes with displacement year fixed effects
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Table B.14: Effect of exposure to violence on timeframe
outcomes using pre-displacement locality and displacement
year fixed effects.
Outcome Variable Estimate SE p-value CI Low CI High N
Can return now? Direct exposure to violence -0.1042 0.0524 0.0487 -0.2070 -0.0015 475
Pre−displacement location safe? Direct exposure to violence -0.1079 0.0476 0.0248 -0.2011 -0.0147 478
Plan to return soon? Direct exposure to violence -0.0154 0.0480 0.7492 -0.1093 0.0786 478
Hope to return at all? Direct exposure to violence 0.0185 0.0718 0.7972 -0.1223 0.1593 478
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B.13 Robustness: Violence measured as direct harm
B.13.1 Direct harm and integration
Table B.15: Effect of exposure to violence on integra-
tion outcomes using personal harm as treatment and pre-
displacement locality fixed effects.
Outcome Variable Estimate SE p-value CI Low CI High N
Integration index Personal exposure to violence -0.243 0.117 0.040 -0.472 -0.014 517
Feel close connection to community Personal exposure to violence 0.053 0.084 0.533 -0.112 0.218 562
Rarely feel like an outsider Personal exposure to violence -0.104 0.048 0.034 -0.199 -0.009 561
Rarely feel isolated Personal exposure to violence -0.090 0.041 0.033 -0.171 -0.008 563
Above average favors from locals Personal exposure to violence 0.019 0.047 0.686 -0.073 0.111 520
Can get help from local non-IDPS Personal exposure to violence -0.070 0.039 0.074 -0.145 0.006 520
B.13.2 Direct harm and trauma
Table B.16: Effect of exposure to violence on trauma
outcomes using personal harm as treatment and pre-
displacement locality fixed effects.
Outcome Variable Estimate SE p-value CI Low CI High N
PTSD or CPTSD diagnosis Personal exposure to violence 0.082 0.042 0.055 -0.001 0.165 569
B.13.3 Direct harm and timeframes
Table B.17: Effect of exposure to violence on time-
frame outcomes using personal harm as treatment and pre-
displacement locality fixed effects.
Outcome Variable Estimate SE p-value CI Low CI High N
Can return now? Personal exposure to violence -0.1056 0.0563 0.0640 -0.2160 0.0048 492
Pre−displacement location safe? Personal exposure to violence -0.1965 0.0579 0.0010 -0.3100 -0.0830 495
Plan to return soon? Personal exposure to violence 0.0310 0.0411 0.4526 -0.0495 0.1114 495
Hope to return at all? Personal exposure to violence 0.0512 0.0568 0.3699 -0.0602 0.1626 495
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B.14 Sensitivity
B.14.1 Sensitivity plot with respect to point estimate
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Figure B.2: Sensitivity of the finding that exposure to violence reduces integration.
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B.14.2 Sensitivity plot with respect to t-value
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Figure B.3: Sensitivity of the finding that exposure to violence reduces integration, in terms
of statistical significance.
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B.15 Robustness: Integration index measure with princi-
pal components analysis
Table B.18: Effect of exposure to violence on index of inte-
gration created through principal components analysis. The
index is the first component, and 46.5% of the variance is
loaded onto it. The five measures have similar weights and
all have a negative sign.
Outcome Variable Estimate SE p-value CI Low CI High N
Integration Index: PCA Exposure to violence 0.3423 0.1052 0.0016 0.136 0.5486 514
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B.16 Robustness: Matching with all covariates
B.16.1 Matching and integration
Table B.19: Effect of exposure to violence on integration
outcomes with exact matching on pre-displacement local-
ity, pre-treatment sociality, gender, marital status and educa-
tiong status. All other covariates are matched by minimizing
Mahalanobis distance. Matches are one-to-one with replace-
ment.
Outcome Estimate SE p-value Num. Obs. (Weighted)
Integration index -0.3911 0.1528 0.0105 44.24
Feel close connection to community -0.0539 0.0468 0.2492 44.24
Rarely feel like an outsider -0.2101 0.0524 0.0001 44.24
Rarely feel isolated -0.1906 0.0478 0.0001 44.24
Above average favors from locals 0.0899 0.0574 0.1173 44.24
Can get help from local non-IDPS -0.0264 0.0493 0.5928 44.24
B.16.2 Matching and trauma
Table B.20: Effect of exposure to violence on trauma out-
comes with exact matching on pre-displacement locality,
pre-treatment sociality, gender, marital status and educationg
status. All other covariates are matched by minimizing Ma-
halanobis distance. Matches are one-to-one with replace-
ment.
Outcome Estimate SE p-value Num. Obs. (Weighted)
PTSD or CPTSD diagnosis 0.1926 0.0482 1e-04 46.18
B.16.3 Matching and timeframes
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Table B.21: Effect of exposure to violence on timeframe
outcomes with exact matching on pre-displacement local-
ity, pre-treatment sociality, gender, marital status and educa-
tiong status. All other covariates are matched by minimizing
Mahalanobis distance. Matches are one-to-one with replace-
ment.
Outcome Estimate SE p-value Num. Obs. (Weighted)
Can return now? -0.1431 0.0598 0.0168 43.53
Pre−displacement location safe? -0.0993 0.0578 0.0859 43.53
Plan to return soon? 0.0395 0.0335 0.2373 43.53
Hope to return at all? 0.1777 0.0600 0.0030 43.53
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#Robustness: Unweighted data with base fixed effects
B.16.4 Unweighted exposure to violence and integration
Table B.22: EFfect of exposure to violence on integration
outcomes with pre-displacement locality fixed effects and
unweighted data.
Outcome Variable Estimate SE p-value CI Low CI High N
Integration index Direct exposure to violence -0.3855 0.1071 0.0005 -0.5955 -0.1755 516
Feel close connection to community Direct exposure to violence 0.0230 0.0340 0.5008 -0.0437 0.0897 561
Rarely feel like an outsider Direct exposure to violence -0.1818 0.0356 0.0000 -0.2516 -0.1120 560
Rarely feel isolated Direct exposure to violence -0.1597 0.0446 0.0005 -0.2471 -0.0722 562
Above average favors from locals Direct exposure to violence 0.0330 0.0499 0.5104 -0.0649 0.1309 519
Can get help from local non-IDPS Direct exposure to violence -0.0788 0.0432 0.0715 -0.1635 0.0059 519
B.16.5 Unweighted exposure to violence and trauma
Table B.23: EFfect of exposure to violence on trauma out-
comes with pre-displacement locality fixed effects and un-
weighted data.
Outcome Variable Estimate SE p-value CI Low CI High N
PTSD or CPTSD diagnosis Direct exposure to violence 0.1219 0.0318 2e-04 0.0596 0.1842 567
B.16.6 Unweighted exposure to violence and timeframes
Table B.24: EFfect of exposure to violence on timeframe
outcomes with pre-displacement locality fixed effects and
unweighted data.
Outcome Variable Estimate SE p-value CI Low CI High N
Can return now? Direct exposure to violence -0.1043 0.0437 0.0191 -0.1899 -0.0186 491
Pre−displacement location safe? Direct exposure to violence -0.1049 0.0472 0.0288 -0.1974 -0.0123 494
Plan to return soon? Direct exposure to violence 0.0250 0.0360 0.4899 -0.0456 0.0956 494
Hope to return at all? Direct exposure to violence 0.0438 0.0666 0.5122 -0.0868 0.1745 494
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B.17 Tabular results for causal mediation analysis
Table B.25: Results of causal mediation analysis. The Av-





Total Effect -0.376 0.006
Prop. Mediated 0.127 0.08
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B.18 Tabular results for employment outcomes
Table B.26: Effect of exposure to violence on employment
outcomes with pre-displacement locality fixed effects.
Outcome Variable Estimate SE p-value CI Low CI High N
Currently employed? Direct exposure to violence -0.0643 0.0596 0.2830 -0.1811 0.0525 594
Secured stable employment? Direct exposure to violence -0.0954 0.0530 0.0746 -0.1993 0.0084 591
Job matches skill set? Direct exposure to violence -0.2083 0.0241 0.0000 -0.2556 -0.1611 371
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Appendix C
Appendix for A theory of targeted and indiscriminate state
violence in networks
C.1 Formal results for section 3.4
C.1.1 Fully connected 3-agent network
C.1.1.1 Payoff to targeted violence in a fully connected 3-agent network
The state eliminates node a and pays cost κ. b leaves the network if the edge between a and
b is essential for b, or θb > αbc and c is mobilized if the edge between a and c is essential,
or θc + αbc. Moreover, if the the edge between a and either node is essential, and either is
essential for the remaining node, then it will leave the network as well.




C.1.1.2 Payoff to indiscriminate violence in a fully connected 3-agent network
The utility to the state of indiscriminate violence can be written as:













+Pr(c, b)(2 + Pr(θa > 0)(1−
1
P
)) + 3Pr(a, b, c)
(C.2)
The probability that a alone is eliminated is the probability of a being eliminated minus
the probability that a and other nodes are eliminated. We can write the probability that a
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and Pr(a, b) = Pr(a, c) = Pr(c, b). Finally, Pr(a, b, c) = 1
27
.
Substituting, the utility to indiscriminate violence can be written as
4
27























































C.1.1.3 Comparing the payoffs to targeted and indiscriminate violence in a fully
connected 3-agent network
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Which is negative (meaning the right hand side is increasing in the impact of mobiliza-
tion) when
σa >
23αbc − 4αac − 21σb − 4αacσb






C.1.2 3-agent network with 2 edges
C.1.2.1 Payoff to targeted violence in a 3-agent network with 2 edges
a is eliminated with certainty, but the action of b or c leaving the network has no further
effect. The payoff can then be written as




C.1.2.2 Payoff to indiscriminate violence in a 3-agent network with 2 edges
The utility to indiscriminate violence can be written as:









+Pr(a, b)(2) + Pr(a, c)(2 + Pr(θb > 0)(1−
1
P






Substituting probabilities, I acquire
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4
27
























































C.1.2.3 Comparing the payoffs to indiscriminate violence in a 3-agent network with
2 edges































































Which is negative when
σb <
6σa − 4αac
21 + 15σa + 4αac196
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C.1.3 3-agent network with 1 edge
C.1.3.1 Payoff to targeted violence in a 3-agent network with 1 edge
a is eliminated with certainty, and spillover effects only affect the choice of b to remain in
the network or leave. The payoff to the state is written in can be written as




C.1.3.2 Payoff to indiscriminate violence in a 3-agent network with 1 edge
The payoff to the state is









+Pr(a, b)(2) + Pr(a, c)(2 + Pr(θb > 0)(1−
1
P




















C.1.3.3 Comparing the payoffs repression strategies in a 3-agent network with 1
edge
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which is negative when
σa >
7σb
−2 + 5σb
and
σb <
2
5
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